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A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION:
PEOPLE V. HAFEEZ
STOPPING THE EXPANSION OF DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE MURDER IN NEW YORK
STATE
BRIAN F. ALLEN*

Under New York Law, a person is guilty of murder in the
second degree, when "under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
thereby causes the death of another person." 2
Known as depraved indifference murder, this crime punishes
unintentional killings where the actor's conduct is so wanton and
reckless as to be treated with the same societal condemnation as
intentional murder. 3 First codified in New York in 1829,4
depraved indifference murder is not a new concept, but one that
has been in existence since the common law. 5
Early
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University, School of Law, June 2004; B.A. Politics, cum
laude, New York University, May 2001. The author would like to thank Professor
Bernard Gegan for all his help and guidence.
I See N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.25 (2003) (providing three types of homicides for second
degree murder under New York Law).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (2) (McKinney 2003).
3 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 705-06 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that in depraved
indifference murder defendant's act is "of such gravity that it placed the crime upon the
same level as the taking of a life by premeditated design"); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W, SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4 (2d ed. 1986) (describing crime of depravedheart murder under common law). See generally ROLLINS M. PERKINS & RONALD N.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 59-60 (Foundation Press, Inc. 1957) (1982) (providing examples of
depraved indifference murder under common law).
4 See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. PT. IV CH. 1, TIT. 1, § 5 (1829) (codifying depraved indifference
murder); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at 710 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (stating "[§ 125.25 of
the NYPL] evolved without substantial change from the Revised Statutes of 1829"). See
generally Bernard E. Gegan, A Case of Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 417,
423 (1975) (discussing origin of depraved mind murder in New York in 1829 statute).
5 See, e.g., SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 476 (Sollom
Emlyn of Lincoln's-Inn, Esq. 1800) (providing classic example of depraved indifference
murder at common law of riding unruly horse into crowd). See EDWARD HYDE EAST, 1
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interpretation by the courts limited depraved indifference
murder in scope and application to a narrow category of
homicides. 6 However, with the revision of the Penal Law in the
1960's7 and subsequent analysis by the courts, 8 there has been a
major expansion in the application of the crime. 9 Requirements
that once limited the application of depraved indifference murder
to a small area of specifically defined criminal actions have now
been removed,1O allowing this crime to be applicable in an ever
broader range of homicides to a point where it is practically
indistinguishable from intentional murder. 1 This shift has led
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 231 (London Professional Books Limited 1972) (1803) (describing
homicide as "depraved inclination to mischief, fall where it may"); see also JAMES F.
STEPHEN, 3 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 22 (1883) (noting that
indifference to human life was considered malice aforethought implied by law). See
generallyM. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, 232-33 (Charles C. Thomas
1978) (providing general overview of murder at common law).
6 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 147 (1854) (articulating limitations on application
of depraved indifference murder); see also People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497, 498 (N.Y.
1924) (upholding interpretation articulated in Darry). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4,
at 426-27 (providing a discussion of decision in Darry).
7 Cf. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. PT. IV CH. 1, TIT. 1, § 5 (1829) (providing original codification
of depraved indifference murder), with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (2003) (articulating
modern definition of depraved mind murder). See People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 616
(N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citing Donnino, Practice Commentaries,
McKINNEY'S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law art. 125, at 491) (stating that
"[t]he depraved indifference category of murder reflects the Legislature's policy
refinement that there is a type of reckless homicide that is so horrendous as to qualify, in
a legal fiction way, for blameworthiness in the same degree as the taking of another's life
intentionally, purposefully and knowingly.").
8 See People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. 1972) (interpreting new statute to
apply to danger to a single victim); see also People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 705-06
(N.Y. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984) (discussing how "depraved indifference" did
not refer to mens rea of depraved indifference murder). See generally Roe, 542 N.E.2d at
611 (stating that subjective intent of defendant is not to be taken into account by the jury
in determining "depraved indifference" to human life).
9 See People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 223 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting)
(noting after years of containment statistical increase in crime to routinely charged with
intentional murder); see also Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (worrying
that depraved indifference holding "finalizes the obliteration of the classical demarcation
between murder and manslaughter in this State, not only for juvenile offenders but also
for all adult accused."). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4 at 458 (noting that "throughout
[a century and a half].... the depraved mind murder subsection has been retained
notwithstanding it anachronistic character.").
10 Cf. Darry, 10 N.Y. at 148 (noting that depraved indifference murder statute
embraces only those acts which though not intentional endanger lives of multiple
persons), with Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (overriding multiple victim requirement
articulated in Darry). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 426-27 (discussing erosion of
holding in Darry).
11 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 218 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (noting that crimes of
depraved indifference and intentional murder are effectively merged); see also Poplis, 281
N.E.2d at 168 (noting that "the new text eliminates the psychiatrically complicating term
'evincing a depraved mind' and is a distinct improvement"). But see Register, 457 N.E.2d
at 706 (noting that "[t]he crime differs from intentional murder in that it results not from
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to a great deal of debate in the courts and among scholars,
raising serious questions concerning the direction of the modern
interpretation of the depraved indifference murder statute, 12 the
proper mens rea required for depraved indifference murder,13
and the ethical responsibilities for prosecutors when seeking
convictions for this ever broadening crime.14
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Hafeez15
took the first step in limiting the expansion of the crime of
depraved indifference murder.
In Hafeez, the court found
depraved indifference murder should not include the planned
killing of a particular individual.16 This note argues that while
Hafeez may present a turning point in the expansion of depraved
indifference murder, it does not go far enough. The crime still
remains applicable to a range of homicides well beyond that

a specific, conscious intent to cause death, but from an indifference to or disregard of the
risks attending defendant's conduct").
12 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 710-14 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (expressing concern for
the interpretation of the modern statute); see also Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615-20 (1989)
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (warning of prosecutorial advantage allowed by this
interpretation). See generally Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 213-35 (Smith, Rosenblatt, Ciprick,
dissenting) (voicing numerous concerns relating to application and interpretation of
depraved mind murder statute).
13 See Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens
Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 468 (1990) [hereinafter Depraved] (discussing mental
culpability issues surrounding modern interpretation of crime of depraved indifference
murder); see also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206-07 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the 'unchanging core requirement' of depraved indifference murder is proof of an
additional mens rea element to recklessness, that is, the defendant's 'uncommonly evil
and morally perverse frame of mind"'). See generally People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 615
(N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (noting that "the tangible content of 'depraved
indifference to human life' is thus elusive...").
14 See Alan C. Michaels, Note, Defining Unintended Murder, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 786,
795 (1984) (noting other states have had to warn prosecutors not to take advantage of
broadness of depraved indifference murder law); see also People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610,
619 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (theorizing that "[p]rosecutors will find the
temptation legally and strategically irresistible, and overcharging traditional reckless
manslaughter conduct as the more serious murderous conduct will become standard
operating procedure in view of the authorized template given for that course of action").
See generally State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me 1980) (noting that "[iun fulfilling
their ethical responsibility, prosecutors must recognize that depraved indifference murder
constitutes a narrow and limited exception to the fundamental principle of our Criminal
Code").
15 792 N.E.2d 1060 (2003).
16 See id. at 1064 (holding conviction for depraved indifference murder improper
where defendant conspired with other to lure victim outside where he was stabbed to
death); see also id. at 1064 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]t is reassuring...
that there are now six Judges of this Court who recognize that even under Sanchez (with
which I have disagreed) depraved indifference murder does have its limits"). See generally
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3 at 617 (describing how depraved-heart murder is
"unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury").
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intended by the legislature or envisioned under traditional
common law notions of the crime.
This note argues that in order to remedy the expansion of
depraved indifference murder, greater restraint must be placed
upon the use and scope of the crime, either by a more narrow
interpretation by the court or by legislative action. Part I
explores the origins of the crime of depraved mind murder in
New York. Part II discusses the broadening of the crime under
the modern Penal Law. Part III analyzes some concerns that
have arisen from the broadening use of depraved indifference
murder. Part IV presents the case of People v. Hafeez and in
light of Hafeez, Part IV presents some possible solutions to the
broad application of the statute. Finally, this note concludes that
although Hafeez was a step in the right direction, greater
restraint by the courts is necessary through realization that the
law of homicide in New York did not spring forth anew with the
1967 Penal Code, but is the product of a legal tradition dating
back to the common law. If the courts are unwilling to act,
legislative action will be necessary.
I. HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE MURDER IN NEW YORK

A. Common Law Origins
To understand how greatly the crime has expanded in New
York, we must begin with an examination of its origins. The
concept of depraved indifference murder dates back to the
common law in the late 1700s, when it was presented in Hale's
Pleas of the Crown.17 Under the common law, all murders were
defined as the killing of another with "malice aforethought."18
17 See HALE, supra note 5; see also Lisa Lockwood, Where are the Parents?Parental
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Children, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 522
(2000) (providing basic elements of depraved indifference). See generally Michelle S.
Jacobs, Criminal Law: Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers
Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 638 n.301 (1998)
(discussing murder under omission theory).
18 See 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 51 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1881) (citing
James Stephen, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAW, Art. 223) (noting murder was defined as
"unlawful homicide with malice aforethought"); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 5 at 233
(noting that under common law murder and manslaughter were distinguished by
presence of malice aforethought). See generally Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 137 (1854)
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Such malice could be expressed, as in the crime of intentional
murder,19 or implied, as in the case of depraved indifference
murder. 20 At common law, in order to grasp the implied malice
requirement, the mens rea of depraved indifference murder was
described as "depravity of mind," 2 1 "an abandoned heart,"2 2 or

simply "depraved mind regardless of human life." 2 3 While
seemingly vague on their face, these colorful terms all attempt to
describe a mens rea of universal or general malice, a depraved
24
inclination not directed at a particular individual.
(quoting C. J. Shaw) (stating that "[t]he natural and necessary conclusion and inference
from such an act willfully done, without apparent excuse, are that it was done malo
animo, in pursuance of a wrongful, injurious purpose, previously... formed, and is
therefore a homicide with malice aforethought, which is the true definition of murder").
19 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 1 (1980) (distinguishing express and implied
malice); see also HALE, supra note 5, at 450 (stating that crime of murder is accompanied
by malice aforethought that is either express or presumed). See generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.02(b)(2) (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that
requisite "malice" for intentional murder is express).
20 See DRESSLER, supra note 19, at § 31.02(b)(2) (noting that malice aforethought is
implied in crime of depraved indifference murder); see also Herbert Wechsler & Jerome
Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 703 (1937) (noting
that malice was implied when defendant's -act was so reckless as to evince a "heart
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief'). See generally Commonwealth v.
Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868) (describing common law implied malice as mental state that
includes ill-will and "every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of
heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty,
although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.").
21 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 953
(1984) (noting that to bring conduct within depraved heart murder statute, defendant
must exhibit "depravity of mind"); see also Darry, 10 N.Y. at 158 (explaining that extreme
"depravity of mind" places imminently dangerous act on same level as intentional killing).
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 1 (noting that "depraved heart murder"
label is derived from decisions and statutes condemning unintentional homicide under
circumstances evincing "depraved mind" as murder).
22 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 475 (1993) (calling "abandoned and malignant
heart" a term of art that describes unintentional homicide committed with extreme
recklessness); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 423 n.l(a) (1980) (noting that in
case of murder, malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and
where all circumstances of killing show abandoned and malignant heart). See generally
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at § 31.05(a)(1) (noting that implied malice is sometimes
described as "an abandoned or malignant heart").
23 See WECHSLER, supra note 20, at 712 (noting that homicides committed
unintentionally by act imminently dangerous to others and evincing "depraved mind
regardless of human life" are usually either first or second degree murder); see also
Michael J. Hoffheimer, Murder and Manslaughter in Mississippi: UnintentionalKillings,
71 MISS. L. J. 35, 62 (2001) (defining as "murder" an act eminently dangerous to others,
and evincing depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any
premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual). See generally
Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1360 (2002) (calling "murder" homicides
perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others and evincing depraved mind
regardless of human life without any premeditated design).
24 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 423 n.1(a) (noting that malice exists where no
Considerable provocation appears, and where all circumstances of killing show abandoned
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Although this crime described conduct where the actor may not
have intended to kill anyone by his dangerous action, at common
law scholars debated whether the actor must have been
subjectively aware of the risk 25 or whether it was enough to show
objectively that a reasonable person would have understood the
very high degree of risk created by the actor's conduct. 2 6 Some
early writers indicated that the actor must have had a subjective
intent to commit some kind of harm or mischief. 27 In contrast,
later writers argued that all that was required was a finding
from the objective circumstances that a reasonable person would
have understood that the actor's conduct probably would cause
death.28

In either case, through a showing of the surrounding
circumstance or the subjective awareness of the actor, the jury
found the actor appreciated the risk but remained indifferent as
to whether a specific individual was killed or not. 29 It was this
and malignant heart); see also Drum, 58 Pa. at 16 (describing malice as mental state that
includes ill-will, wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of
consequences, and mind regardless of social duty). See generally WECHSLER, supra note
20, at 703 (stating that malice is implied when act is so reckless as to evince a heart
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief).
25 Compare STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 22 (arguing that actor must be subjectively
aware of risk in order for law to imply malice aforethought), with HOLMES, supra note 18,
at 55-56 (suggesting that objective circumstances are enough). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 4 (noting general conception that serious felony sanctions
should be grounded securely in actor's subjective culpability).
26 See HOLMES, supra note 18, at 55-56 (explaining that malice can be inferred from
actions "a person of ordinary prudence" would foresee are likely to cause death); see also
WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.06
(7th ed. 1967) (suggesting that liability for murder will fix to defendant who "ought
reasonably to know" of risk). See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at § 7.4
(acknowledging existence of dispute as to whether defendant must subjectively be aware
of great risk which his conduct creates in order to be guilty of murder).
27 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 953
(1984) (noting that focus of depraved mind murder is not on subjective intent but rather
upon objective assessment of degree of risk presented by defendant's reckless conduct); see
also EAST, supra note 5, at 231 (providing that malice aforethought would be implied
when act was done with mischievous intent). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 4
(acknowledging general conception that serious felony sanctions should fix only when
actor is subjectively aware of the risk created).
28 See CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 26, § 10.06 (noting that actor's subjective
intent is not examined since it is presumed by "natural and probable consequences of the
voluntary act"); see also HOLMES, supra note 18, at 53-54 (offering example of defendant
who is aware that act will very certainly cause death and when such probability is
common knowledge will be culpable for murder). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt.
4 (acknowledging general conception that serious felony sanctions should only fix when
the actor is subjectively aware of risk created).
29 See Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 449 (Pa. 1946) (holding that defendant
displayed requisite malice as evidenced by intentional doing of uncalled-for act in callous
disregard of its likely harmful effects on others); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, at §
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appreciation of the extreme risk of death caused by the actor's
conduct and his indifference to the result, which evinced
depravity, and from which malice aforethought could be
implied.30

Some examples of the traditional notions of depraved
indifference murder include shooting at a house known to be
occupied, 3 1 riding an unruly horse through a crowd, 32 or opening

a lion's cage. 33 Although each of these actions illustrate conduct
which the actor knew created an extreme risk that death would
result, none of these examples presented a specific intent to kill
or express malice directed at a particular individual. Rather, the
nature of the actor's conduct allowed malice aforethought to be
implied in each of these instances by the finding of the mental
state described as "general malice or depraved inclination, fall
where it may." 3 4
31.05(a)(2) (explaining that showing wanton and willful disregard of likelihood that
behavior has natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm will result in finding of
implied malice). See generally HOLMES, supra note 18, at 56 (stating malice will be
inferred objectively when actor engages in behavior that person of ordinary prudence
would foresee as likely to cause death).
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 4 (noting that "recklessness" requisite for
finding of depraved heart murder presupposes awareness of creation of substantial
homicidal risk and infers disregard of such risk); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, at §
31.05(a)(2) (explaining that malice is implied in depraved heart murder because accused
shows wanton and willful disregard of likelihood that the type of behavior in which he is
engaging has natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm). See generally
HOLMES, supra note 18, at 56 (stating malice is inferred objectively from actions "a person
of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause death").
31 See People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497, 497-98 (N.Y. 1924) (upholding conviction
for depraved indifference murder where actor fired into house known to be occupied). See
generally Malone, 47 A.2d at 449 (affirming depraved heart murder conviction in case of
"Russian Poker," where participants place single cartridge in one revolver chamber and
twirl cylinder); Myrick v. State, 34 S.E.2d 36, 40 (Ga. 1945) (affirming conviction of
depraved heart murder where defendant intention to shoot over his victim's head in order
to scare him resulted in victim's death).
32 See HALE, supra note 5, at 476 (citing riding unruly horse down crowded street as
an example of acting with abandoned and malignant heart). See generally State v. Ibn
Omar-Muhammad, 694 P.2d 922, 927 (N.M. 1985) (holding that trying to run law
enforcement personnel off road and knowingly driving at high rate of speed through police
roadblocks required jury instruction on depraved mind murder); State v. Trott, 130 S.E.
627, 630 (N.C. 1925) (finding requisite recklessness, wantonness, depravity necessary to
raise inference of malice where defendant drove his car at high speed down main street
resulting in the death of the victim).
33 See HECHTMAN, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, MCKINNEY'S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y., Book
39, Penal Law, § 125.25, p. 251 (providing examples of depraved indifference murder). See
generally State v. Davidson, 987 P.2d 335, 345 (Kan. 1999) (affirming trial court decision
that defendant showed extreme indifference to value of human life by harboring and
failing to train vicious dogs that subsequently mauled child to death); People v. Burden,
140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 292 (Ca. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding lower court's finding of abandoned
and malignant heart where defendant failed to feed her infant for two weeks).
34 EAST, supra note 5, at 223.
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B. Revised Statutes of 1829
In New York, the crime of depraved indifference murder was
first codified in 1829.35 Under the original statute, an actor's
conduct was punishable as murder "when perpetrated by an act
imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind
regardless of human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular individual."36
The first major examination of this new statute by the Court of
Appeals occurred in 1854 with the case of Darry against the
People.3 7 In Darry, the defendant was convicted of murder after
beating his wife to death over the course of a week.3 8 Judge
Selden, writing one of three majority opinions, drew on the
construction of the 1829 statute in reaching two conclusions to
explain the application of depraved indifference murder in New
York. At the outset, Judge Selden noted that "each subdivision
[of the murder statute] should be construed to provide for a
separate and distinct class of cases," 39 that each section should
be "construed in light of all the rest"40 and "if possible, that no
case or class of cases will fall within more than one branch of the
act."41

With this notion serving as his basis, Judge Selden first
explained that "a depraved mind regardless of human life"
described the mens rea of the act, 4 2 a mens rea that required a
35 See GEGAN, supra note 4, at 423 (discussing 1829 depraved mind murder statute,
which preceded present-day statute); see also People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 606 (N.Y.
Supp. Ct. 1838) (stating that killing would be murder even in absence of intent if such
killing was perpetrated by act imminently dangerous to others and evincing depraved
mind). See generally People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (holding that
act imminently dangerous to others and evincing depraved mind regardless of human life
fell within common law definition of malice aforethought).
36 GEGAN, supra note 4, at 423 (quoting 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. PT. IV, CH. 1, TIT. 1, § 5
(1829)).
37 10 N.Y. 120 (1854). See People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497, 498 (N.Y. 1924)
(stating that Darry provided early consideration of newly revised statutes). See generally
GEGAN, supra note 4, at 426 (noting Darry as leading case of depraved mind murder in
New York).
38 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 157 (N.Y. 1854) (providing the basic facts of the
case); see also United States v. Berg, 31 M.J. 38, 40 (C.M.A. 1990) (highlighting the basic
facts of the Derry case). See generally People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 210 (N.Y. 2002)
(describing the conduct of the defendant in Darry).
39 Darry, 10 N.Y. at 140.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 142 (noting that "a depraved mind regardless of human life" describes
mental state of crime); see also Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498 (listing "depravity" along
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showing of general malice. Similar to the common law, under
this idea of "general malice" the actor's deadly conduct was not
directed towards any particular individual but endangered the
lives of many, 4 3 and was "perpetrated with a full consciousness of
the probable consequences." 44 To make a finding of general
malice, juries could examine the nature or surrounding
45
circumstances of the actor's conduct to infer depravity of mind.
However, Judge Selden believed that a necessary element of
depravity was a finding that the actor was subjectively aware of
the risk of his actions.4 6 Although the actor may even have
intended to take a life, that intent was not directed at any
and
general
instead
was
but
individual
particular
indiscriminate. 4 7 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Selden drew
the concept of general malice directly from East's Pleas of the
Crown and as a result, the court's interpretation remained in
harmony with the common law understanding of the crime that
had preceded it for hundreds of years.
Judge Selden reasoned that this narrow interpretation, limited
8
in scope, was necessary to prevent "a sea of uncertainty"4
surrounding the application of the statute; as it could be applied
to every case of homicide "provided a jury can be found to say the
with "recklessness" as required mental states under statute). See generally People v.
Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983) (conceding that under old statute "depraved
mind" served as mens rea for crime).
43 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854) (noting statute applies only to acts
that endanger lives of many persons); see also People v. Ludkowitz, 194 N.E. 688, 692
(N.Y. 1935) (following Darry's "danger to many" requirement to overturn conviction). But
see People v. France, 57 A.D.2d 432, 434 (N.Y.App. Div. 1977) (signaling later demise of
"danger to many" requirement).
44 Darry, 10 N.Y. at 148.
45 See People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497, 498 (N.Y. 1924) (arguing that jury can
infer from actions of defendant that he knew of risk and disregarded it); see also People v.
Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 219 (N.Y. 2002) (articulating that courts often look to conduct of
defendant to see if jury could have inferred proper mens rea). See generally Darry, 10 N.Y.
at 137 (rejecting "implied malice" from crime itself and requiring proof of malice outside
act itself).
46 See Darry, 10 N.Y. at 148 (noting act must be one "perpetrated with a full
consciousness of the probable consequences"); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at 710 (citing
Darry as requiring subjective awareness and disregard of his actions as part of "depraved
mind" element). See generally France, 57 A.D.2d at 434 (preserving subjectivity
requirement from Darry).
47 See Darry, 10 N.Y. at 147 (noting statute applies to cases where intent to take life
exists but intent is "general and indiscriminate"); see also Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498
(pointing to "general and indiscriminate" intent rather than intent directed at particular
individual). See generally People v. Darragh, 141 A.D. 408, 413-14 (N.Y.App. Div. 1910)
(describing intent as "not directed at any particular individual").
48 Darry, 10 N.Y. at 148.
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act produced death evincing a 'depraved mind regardless of
human life."'49 Judge Selden's second conclusion, stressing a
"danger to many" requirement, provided a strong division
between intentional and depraved indifference murder while
attempting to capture the idea of general malice under the
common law. As a result, Judge Selden's interpretation of the
depraved indifference in Darry has been seen by scholars to be a
"composite
product
of historical
continuity,
statutory
interpretation, and moral proportionality."5 0
C. Continuity in Interpretationthough Penal Code Revisions
Judge Selden's interpretation of depraved indifference murder
articulated in Darry was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals
seventy years later in People v. Jernatowski.51 In the interim,
the Penal Law had been revised on several occasions with the
exception of one word; the crime of depraved indifference murder
remained the same.5 2
In Jernatowski, the defendant was
convicted after firing several shots into a house known to be
occupied, killing the victim. 5 3 The Court, in upholding the
conviction, noted the fulfillment of the "danger to many"
requirement,5 4 and found general malice by a showing of the
defendant's "wicked and depraved conduct." 55 The Court of
49 Id.
50 GEGAN, supra note 4, at 437.
51 144 N.E. 497 (N.Y. 1924) (reaffirming holding in Darry). See People v. Sanchez, 777
N.E.2d 204, 219-20 (N.Y. 2002) (linking Jernatowski to Darry). See generally People v.
Smith, 76 Misc.2d 867, 868 (N.Y. Misc. 1973) (equating holdings in Darry and
Jernatowski).
52 See Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498 (reacting that change did not make any difference
in application of law); see also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 219 (calling statute in Jernatowski
"almost identical" to statute in Darry). See generally People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704,
710 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (noting that depraved mind murder statute has
undergone little substantive change since its initial enactment).
53 See Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 497 (describing facts of case); see also Martin R.
Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law
Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, n457 (1993) (mentioning facts of Jernatowski).
See generally Paul Marcus, The Model Penal Code and Commentaries, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 811, 822 (1982) (book review) (citing general facts of Jernatowski).
54 See Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498 (noting that there were multiple persons in
house); see also Elizabeth Rappaport, CapitalMurder and the Domestic Discount: A Study
of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1545 (1996)
(describing "room in which several persons are known to be"). See generally Guyora
Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 759
(2000) (reviewing SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF
MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER (2000)) (mentioning harm to many people requirement).
55 Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498-99 (finding conviction "amply justified").
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Appeals noted once again the two limited instances in which
The first
depraved indifference murder could be applied.
included "those cases where an intent to take life exists, which is
not directed at any particular person but is general and
indiscriminate." 56 The second instance, which was thought to be
almost identical, embraced conduct "in which death is produced
by acts putting the lives of many in jeopardy, under
circumstances evincing great depravity and utter reckless regard
to human life." 5 7 In maintaining this interpretation of depraved
indifference murder, the application of the crime was confined to
a small well-defined subset of all homicides, closely following the
understanding of the crime under the common law. 58 This was
all to change, however, with the passage of the modern Penal
Law in 1967.59 Under the modern codification, the Court of
Appeals in a series of decisions marginalized Judge Selden's
opinion in Darry.
II. THE MODERN CODIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF THE CRIME

The modern codification of depraved indifference murder in
New York was the product of a study conducted by the Revision
Commission of the Penal Law during the 1960's,60 which was
61
influenced by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
56 Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498 (stating interpretation was first considered in Darry).
57 Id.
58 See id. (noting that interpretation of statute closely mimics common law); see also
People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 209 (N.Y. 2002) (reviewing common law interpretation
which notes malice is implied when act was "so reckless as to evince a 'heart regardless of
social duty and fatally bent on mischief"'). See generally MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 788
(1985) (discussing common law methods of determining depraved indifference).
59 N.Y. PENAL LAw (McKinney 1967). See Major Eugene R. Milhizer, Murder Without
Intent: Depraved-Heart Murder Under Military Law, 133 MIL. L. REV. 205, 242 n.233
(1991) (discussing NY legislatures "intent to enlarge scope of depraved heart murder
under state law to reach homicides where only victim was placed at risk by defendant's
wanton conduct"). See generally John F. Decker, Article: Addressing Vagueness,
Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENY. U.L. REV. 241,
243 (2002) (comparing methods used among courts in addressing ambiguities in criminal
law).
60 See L. 1961 Ch. 346 § 2 (1961) (creating Temporary State Commission On Revision
of the Penal Law and Criminal Code); see also State of NY. 1962 TEMP. COMM'N ON REV.
OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE INTERIM REP. 41 at 5 (explaining Commission's
creation, structure and function). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 436 (discussing
change of murder provisions with adoption of Penal Law).
61
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962) (stating in part criminal homicide
constitutes murder when "it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 1 at 13
(1980) (reviewing common law definitions of murder). See generally Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d
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Although the 1967 Revised Penal Law marked a major overhaul
in the criminal code in New York State, 62 the Commission did
not disturb the core idea of certain crimes that remained the
foundation of the criminal law. 6 3 Rather, the purpose of the
Commission was to simplify the law in order to more accurately
define criminal acts and to remove ambiguities that had existed
in the prior codes. 6 4 During the revision, the wording of the
crime of depraved indifference murder was changed to more
closely reflect that of the Model Penal Code.65 Although the
similarity in wording between the two statutes suggests the
Commission may have been adopting the Model Penal Code, this
is not likely the case. The Commission Staff notes state that the
new statute is "substantially a restatement" 66 of the former

codification of depraved indifference murder.

In light of the

at 209 (noting Penal Law Revision Commission acknowledged its "special debt to the
Model Code").
62 See 1962 TEMP. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMI. CODE
INTERIM REP. 41 at 7 (noting magnitude of Commission's study); see also Sanchez, 777
N.E.2d at 210 (stating Darry no longer "continues to provide the bedrock of our reckless
murder jurisprudence.. . our contemporary statutory and decisional law of that form of
murder leaves Darry far behind."). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 436 (stating
murder provisions of Revised Statutes of 1829 remained substantially same until
adoption of new Penal Law in 1967).
63 See 1962 TEMP. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE
INTERIM REP. 41 at 7 (stating core fundamentals of certain criminal provision would be
retained); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 4 at 21 (1980) (noting recklessness as
defined "presupposes an awareness of the creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too
great to be deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves"). See
generally Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 209 (stating American Law Institutes Model Penal Code
is particularly instructive).
64 See 1964 TEMP STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL
CODE, Proposed New York Penal Law, Sen. Intro. 3918; Assem. Intro. 5376, v (1964)
(noting Commission was created to simply and remove ambiguities in Penal Law); see also
1964 STATE OF N.Y. TEMP. COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE, THIRD
INTERIM REP. 14 at 11 (outlining proposed penal law). See generally 1962 STATE OF N.Y.
TEMP. COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE INTERIM REP. 41 at 16
(stating "the plan is to reduce the size of the Penal Law; to mold it into a clear, concise
and basically comprehensive body of law under a suitable category type of arrangement;
and to make numerous substantive changes of both major and minor importance").
65 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1980) (defining reckless murder under Model
Penal Code), with N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(2) (2004) (providing definition of depraved
indifference murder in New York). See generally MILHIZER, supra note 59, at 242-43
(discussing difficulty of sorting out concepts such as culpability and court methods of
dealing with ambiguity).
66 If the modern codification of depraved indifference murder was meant to make a
sweeping change in the law, the Commission Staff Notes of the Proposed Penal Law do
not make that evident. Rather, the commission notes only that "Subdivision 2 [depraved
indifference murder] presenting the highest crime of reckless homicide, is substantially a
restatement of a similar crime defined as first degree murder under the existing Penal
Law [§ 1044(2)]". See TEMP N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM
CODE, ProposedNew York Penal Law, Sen. Intro. 3918; Assem. Intro. 5376, 339 (1964).
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Commission Staff notes, the similarity in wording may have been
for the purpose of achieving greater clarity without a major
67
disruption of the core understanding of the crime.
A. Removal in "dangerto many requirement"
The first major change in the application of the depraved
indifference murder statute occurred in People v. Poplis. 6 8 In
Poplis, the Court of Appeals, noting the wording of the new
statute, found that depraved indifference murder was now
applicable where the harmful conduct was directed at only one
person. 69
This modification, overriding the interpretation
espoused in Darry, allowed the scope of the crime to be expanded
to areas previously restricted by the courts to actions directed at
a single individual. 70 The Court, in reaching its decision, found
that the holding in Darry "turned on a limitation in the
statute... which was subsequently corrected by amendment." 7 1
Yet, in dismissing Darry, the Court of Appeals seems to have
overlooked what Judge Selden was attempting to accomplish
with the "danger to many" requirement. The "danger to many"
requirement presented a means of creating a bright line test is
readily apparent to a jury, whereby jurors could grasp the idea of
general malice by looking at the surrounding circumstances of
67 See 1964 STATE OF N.Y. TEMP. COMM'N ON REV. OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIM.
CODE, THIRD INTERIM REP. 14 at 22. (noting depraved indifference murder has been
retained in murder category); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962) (stating
requirements set forth set better means of establishing culpability). See generally People
v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 209 (N.Y. 2002) (noting close connection between Commission
creating NY Penal law and Model Penal Code).
68 281 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1972) (holding continued beating of child leading to death
satisfied depraved indifference for murder conviction); see also People v. Mills, 2003 N.Y.
LEXIS 3369, *6-7 (2003) (holding conviction for criminally negligent homicide was not
barred by statute of limitations). See generally People v. Johnson, 662 N.E.2d 1066, 1067
(N.Y. 1996) (noting reckless conduct directed at adults also fits under depraved
indifference).
69 See Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (noting requirement of danger to multiple persons
was corrected by amendment to penal law and statute was not applicable where danger
was directed at only one person); see also Mills, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS at *10 n.3 (reiterating
depraved indifference murder may involve only one victim). See generally People v. Cole,
652 N.E.2d 912, 913 (N.Y. 1995) (holding brutality towards child fit into understanding of
depraved indifference to human life).
70 See Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (convicting defendant for depraved indifference
murder when harm aimed at only one person); see also People v. Fink, 674 N.Y.S.2d 793,
794 (3d Dep't 1998) (upholding conviction when defendant assisted in stabbing single
victim to death). See generally People v. Cunningham, 635 N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (3d Dep't
1995) (affirming conviction after defendant shot victim in chest with shot gun).
71 Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168.
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the act to determine whether many people were endangered, in
order to establish the actor's depraved mind, regardless of human
life. 72 Criticism of the "danger to many" approach was not that it

was unclear, but that it was under inclusive. 73 Scholars have
questioned why extremely reckless conduct was murder when
directed at a group of people and not an individual. 74
In Poplis, the court failed to recognize the need for an alternate
means of limiting the application of the crime. Judge Seldon's
"danger to many" requirement was not simply created by a
casual reading of the statute, but was a means of concretely
separating the crimes of intentional and depraved indifference
murder. The "danger to many" requirement served as an
instrument to prevent abuse by an overbroad application of the
crime. 7 5 Although Poplis did not appreciate the motives behind
the "danger to many" requirement, the case did remain
committed to the overall analysis of the mens rea of depraved
indifference murder articulated by the Darry court. 76

72 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 146-47 (1854) (holding general malice can be
inferred from circumstances surrounding defendant's actions if many lives are
endangered as opposed to one particular life); see also People v. Darragh, 141 A.D. 408,
413-14 (1st Dep't 1910) (adopting Judge Seldin's holding and reasoning for danger to
many requirement). See generally Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental
State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 1009 (1998) (emphasizing advantage for jury in finding
general malice exists in Judge Seldin's interpretation of depraved indifference).
73 It has been argued that the multiple victim approach "ultimately fails because it
excludes too much." MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 799. However, it has been argued that
intentional murder acts aimed at one individual is an over-inclusive approach. Kenneth
W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 505-06 n.146 (1992).
74 See GEGAN, supra note 4, at 434 (raising questions about danger to many
requirement); see also People v. Poplis 281 N.E.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. 1972) (expressing how
even court system raised some doubts about necessity for many people to be in danger for
higher culpability). See generally MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 799 (explaining rationale
between applying and rejecting multiple victim approach for depraved indifference).
75 See Darry, 10 N.Y. at 147 (noting that if statute not limited then crime could be
applied to all types of homicides); see also People v. France, 394 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (3d
Dep't 1977) (recognizing that depraved indifference for others, such as shooting into
crowded area, involves neither specific intent nor recklessness). See generally MICHAELS,
supra note 14, at 799 (observing that depraved indifference should be afforded protection
from misuse by attorneys and judges and juries).
76 See Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (stressing that both former statute and present one
"embrace 'extremely dangerous and fatal conduct performed without specific homicidal
intent but with a depraved kind of wantonness' ');see also People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d
204, 220 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J. dissenting) (emphasizing how Poplis maintained
Darry's interpretation of depraved indifference, but dropped danger to many
requirement). See generally France, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (discussing application of Poplis
and depraved indifference standard of Darry as abandonment of concern for those around
actor).
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B. A Change in Mens Rea
This was all to change eleven years later when the Court of
Appeals re-examined the mens rea of the crime. 77 The previous
definition of depraved indifference murder required a mens rea of
"a depraved mind, regardless of human life."78 The modern
statute, on the other hand, required "recklessness" with
"circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life."7 9
Although Poplis noted that the different phasing of the statutes
reached a very similar effect,8 0 the significance of this change in
language has been the central focus of the debate surrounding
the mens rea requirement under the modern statute. 8 1 The
modern penal law, following the model penal code defines only
four mental states: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently. 82 Since the statute used only the term "reckless," a

77 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 710 (N.Y. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 953
(1984) (noting only mens rea requirement for depraved indifference murder is
recklessness); see also People v. Cole, 652 N.E.2d 912, 913 (N.Y. 1995) (emphasizing
uniformity of depraved indifference standard between Poplis and Register decisions). See
generally People v. Swartz, 520 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (discussing how
Register examined historical substance of depraved indifference and found it relatively
parallel with New York statutory law).
78 See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 183 (1907) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney's 2000)) (defining depraved indifference murder under murder in first degree);
see also People v. Hughson, 47 N.E. 1092, 1095 (N.Y. 1897) (defining crime of murder
under old Penal Code). See generally People v. Conroy, 97 N.Y. 62, 67 (1884) (stating
statutory framework for depraved indifference murder under § 183).
79 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney's 2000) (stating elements of depraved
indifference murder under murder in second degree); see also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 205
(citing depraved indifference murder requirements under New York Penal Law). See
generally People v. Russell, 693 N.E.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. 1998) (asserting depraved
indifference requirements in New York).
80 See Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (noting that former statute is very similar in effect to
present murder statute); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707-08 (noting how concept
behind depraved indifference remained in new statute despite change in statutory
description). See generally People v. Magliato, 494 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-310 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (outlining common notions behind both statutes, despite their classification of
different degrees of murder).
81 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 276 (discussing significance of "under circumstances
evincing depraved indifference to human life"); see also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206-07
(demonstrating ongoing debate between majority and dissent regarding mens rea
requirement of current depraved indifference murder statute in New York). See generally
People v. Word, 689 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (emphasizing how subject of
mens rea for depraved indifference murder in New York is ongoing issue under new
statute).
82 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 ( McKinney's 2000) (defining four possible mens rea
elements); see also People v. Mattison, 428 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(listing types of potential mens rea in New York). See generally People v. Simon, 562
N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990) (noting four mens rea elements under New York
law).
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major question remained as to where "circumstance evincing a

depraved indifference to human life" fit with in this crime.
The Court of Appeals addressed this question in People v.
Register.8 3 In Register, the defendant was convicted of depraved
indifference murder after firing a gun in a crowded bar room
killing two people.8 4 On appeal, the defendant argued that
because of his extreme level of intoxication he did not have the
requisite mens rea to be convicted of the crime. 85 The court, in
rejecting this defense held that "under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life" referred to "neither the
mens rea or actus reus. If it states an element of the crime at all,
it is not an element in the traditional sense but rather a
definition of the factual setting in which the risk creating the
conduct must occur." 8 6 The court further noted that the "focus of

the offense was not upon the subjective intent of the
defendant.. .but rather upon an objective assessment of the
degree of risk presented by the defendant's reckless conduct,"87
an assessment to be made by the jury in order to determine if the
defendant's actions were so grave as to place it on the same level
as intentional murder. 88
Thus, the only mens rea required for conviction of this crime
was "recklessness" and the "concept of depraved indifference was
83 457 N.E.2d 704, cert denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1983).
84 See id. at 272-73 (discussing facts for which defendant was charged with depraved
indifference and why case is now on appeal).
85 See id. at 273 (stating grounds for appeal); see also People v. Zebrowski, 604
N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (App. Div. 1993) (reiterating that intoxication cannot negate
recklessness element of depraved indifference). See generally RICHARD A. GREENBURG ET
AL, NEW YORK CRIMINAL LAW § 6:13 (West 2002) (noting intoxication is not defense to
depraved indifference murder).
86 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (discussing how depraved indifference is not
traditional element of crime); see also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 207 (reaffirming notion
developed in Register that modern depraved indifference standard is not mens rea
element in traditional sense). See generally Word, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (emphasizing that
depraved indifference is not mens rea element for purposes of determining whether
conduct constituted second-degree murder).
87 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (noting proper focus for depraved indifference
murder); see also People v. Strawbridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (App. Div. 2002)
(stressing proper test for depraved indifference involves objective assessment of actor's
degree of risk). See generally People v. Lyons, 721 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (App. Div. 2001)
(noting that inquiry into subjective intent for depraved indifference is not relevant).
88 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 706 (noting proper role of jury when examining crime of
depraved indifference murder); see also People v. Soto, 660 N.Y.S.2d 49, 49 (App. Div.
1997) (noting purpose for objective assessment is for trier of facts to determine if depraved
indifference existed). See generally People v. Robinson, 613 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285 (App. Div.
1994) (holding that it is for jury to objectively decide whether actor's conduct constituted
blameworthiness similar to intentional murder).
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retained in the new statute not to function as a mens rea element
but to objectively define the circumstances which must exist to
elevate homicide from manslaughter to murder."8 9 However, this
case did not end the debate over depraved indifference murder's
mens rea requirements.
Even with the holding in Register that the only mens rea
requirement
for
depraved
indifference
murder
was
"recklessness," there remained some confusion by the courts as to
what degree of recklessness ought to be applied. 90
Under
Register, the jury must look at the actor's subjective mental state
only to establish recklessness, and then the jury must shift to the
objective circumstances surrounding the reckless conduct to
make a qualitative judgment as to whether those circumstances
evince a "depraved indifference to human life."91 Yet the courts
seem to admit that depraved indifference murder requires more
than ordinary "recklessness."9 2 The courts have charged juries to
convict on a finding of conduct that is "beyond being reckless, is
so wanton, so deficient in moral sense and concern, so devoid of
regard for the life or the lives of others," 9 3 to equate this conduct
with intentional murder. Further, the Court of Appeals has
instructed that "a 'wanton indifference to human life or a
depravity of mind'. .. is essential to depraved indifference

89 People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 953
(1984).
90 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (noting that only mens rea for depraved
indifference murder is recklessness); see also People v. Fink, 674 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App.
Div. 1998) (stating that "depraved indifference is not akin to mere recklessness"). See
generally People v. Fenner, 463 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 1984) (noting crime requires
"conduct beyond being reckless).
91 Register, 457 N.E.2d at 705-06 (discussing role of jury in finding a person guilty
under depraved indifference murder); see also, People v. Brathwaite, 472 N.E.2d 29, 31-32
(N.Y. 1984) (holding it was proper to submit to jury charge of depraved indifference
murder upon evidence of accessorial liability). See generally People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d
167, 168 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that depraved indifference murder can be decided by jury
when defendant beats child to death).
92 People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (N.Y. 2002) (arguing that Register
required a significantly heightened recklessness); see also Brathwaite, 472 N.E.2d at 31
(stating that jury was charged that defendant's conduct must be beyond being reckless).
See generally Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168 (stating that murder prescription requires more
than recklessly causing death).
93 Brathwaite, 472 N.E.2d at 842. See People v. Russell, 693 N.E.2d 193, 194 (N.Y.
1998) (stating that depraved conduct must be wanton and void of moral concern); see also
Fenner, 463 N.E.2d at 618 (charging jury with proper standard for assessing whether
defendant's actions evinced depravity).
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murder." 9 4 How then does this concession by the court that
depraved indifference murder requires conduct that is "beyond
reckless" reconcile with the argument by the court that the Penal
Code admits only four mens rea elements?
Taken together, it appears that the court may have been
attempting to capture the idea of implied malice while working
within the confines of the statute, requiring that there was some
subjective understanding on the part of the defendant that his
actions were harmful but then also requiring an objective
assessment of the facts surrounding the act to infer a "depraved
mind." If this is the case, Register seems to have followed the
writing of Justice Holmes, 9 5 but at the same time the court also
admits that the crime of depraved indifference murder requires a
mens rea higher than "recklessness."9 6 However, if the Register
court understood the concept of general malice and of inferring
surrounding
"depravity"
from
the
the
defendants
circumstances, 9 7 later courts appear to have concerned
themselves more with the objective circumstances than the
subjective mens rea of the defendant.
C. An emphasis of the Objective Circumstance
The Court of Appeals built upon their concern for the objective
circumstances surrounding the act in People v. Roe,98 a case
involving a 15-year old boy engaged in a game of "Polish roulette"

94 People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 206 (N.Y. 1986). See Fenner, 463 N.E.2d at
618 (instructing jury as such); see also People v. Magliato, 494 N.Y.S.2d 307, 310 (App.
Div. 1985) (noting burden of proof on prosecution for depraved indifference murder).
95 See HOLMES, supra note 18, at 51 (arguing that although there must be some
subjective realization on part of defendant); see also McManus, 496 N.E.2d at 206 (stating
that finding of depravity requires inquiry into objectives circumstances of crime). But see
STEPHEN, supra note 5 (discussing subjective assessment).
96 Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (noting that although only mens rea element is
"recklessness" something more is needed to elevate crime from manslaughter to murder);
see also People v. Fink, 674 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App. Div. 1998) (stating "depraved
indifference is not akin to mere recklessness"). See generally Fenner, 463 N.E.2d at 618
(noting crime requires "conduct beyond being reckless").
97 The extent to which using the objective assessment of the circumstances
surrounding the act to quantify the degree of risk breaks from the common law is a
matter of debate. Compare HOLMES, JR., supra note 95, which argues for objective
assessment, with STEPHEN, supra note 5, finding in favor of a subjective assessment. For
a further discussion of both subjective and objective standards for other crimes and
defenses, see Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, A Crime
of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (1989).
98 542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989).
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with a shotgun. 99 The defendant claimed that he did not intend
to harm the victim and was unaware that he had chambered a
"live" round, which discharged and killed the victim.10 0 However,
as the majority explained, "the actor's subjective mental state is
not pertinent to a determination of the additional element
required in depraved indifference murder."101 Further, the court
rejected any examination of the defendant's emotional condition
or mens rea after the act had occurred. 10 2 Thus, the objective
criteria for the jury to base its determination of depravity is
limited to the objective circumstances leading up to the act which
create a very substantial risk of death.103 This interpretation is
especially troubling when one considers that the mens rea of
''recklessness" is the same mental state that is used to define
both depraved indifference murder and the crime of
manslaughter. 104 The effect, as scholars have argued raised
serious questions of fairness, as many actions previously only
punishable as manslaughter are now swept into category of
depraved indifference murder.105
D. Refusal to Allow Defense of "Extreme Emotional Disturbance"
Still, the Court has gone further in refusing to take in to
account the subjective mental state of the defendant in
determining "depraved indifference." In People v. Farden,106 the
court denied the application of the defense of "extreme emotional
disturbance" to the crime of depraved indifference murder. In
reaching it decision, the Court noted a significant difference
99 See id. at 613 (stating the facts of the case).
100 See id. (stating that defendant did not realize that how he had loaded gun).
101 Id at 612.
102 See id. (noting defendant's emotional condition after killing is besides point).
103 See id. (holding "evidence of the actor's subjective mental state... is not pertinent
to a determination of the additional element required for depraved indifference murder").
104 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (stating that recklessness is required for depravity
and manslaughter); see also People v. Word, 689 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (App. Div. 1999) (noting
that evidence of mental state is significant only to a threshold determination of
recklessness and not relevant to depravity). See generally People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d
202, 206 (N.Y. 1986) (noting recklessness is mens rea for manslaughter and depravity).
105 See Depraved, supra note 13, at 430 (1990) (arguing depraved indifference murder
is not sufficiently distinguishable from manslaughter); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05
(2003) (defining culpable mental states as intentional, knowingly, recklessly, and criminal
negligence). See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) & (4) (2003) (distinguishing
recklessness and criminal negligence).
106 628 N.E.2d 41 (1993).

894

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.18:3

between the common law defense of "heat of passion" and the
modern "extreme emotional disturbance," finding that the latter
is not applicable to depraved indifference murder.10 7 The court
held that the legislature, because of the positioning of the
language in the statute, made a policy decision only to include
such a defense as part of intentional murder. 0 8 Yet such a
reading seems to run counter to our understanding of the crime.
Under this reading, an actor who intentionally brings about
the death of an individual is allowed the benefit of showing
"extreme emotional disturbance" as a mitigating factor to the
crime of murder, but a person with the lesser mental state of
recklessness, is denied such mitigation.10 9 If depravity of mind is
the central core of depraved indifference murder, it does not
appear possible to find that such depravity of mind exists while
the defendant is under an extreme emotional disturbance.110 It
is the "unmotivated wickedness" that defines depraved
of extreme emotional
Evidence
murder."'
indifference
107 See Fardan, 628 N.E.2d at 43 (noting difference between concept of "heat of
passion" and "extreme emotional disturbance"); see also People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d
898, 907-08 (N.Y. 1976) aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (noting difference between heat of
passion and extreme emotional disturbance is spontaneous nature of action). See
generally People v. Fiorentino, 91 N.E. 195, 196 (N.Y. 1910) (stating heat of passion is
immediate reaction to events without time to reflect or deliberate).
108 See Fardan, 628 N.E.2d at 44 (observing that legislature included extreme
emotional disturbance only as part of intentional theory of murder); see also People v.
Harris, 740 N.E.2d 227, 229 (N.Y. 2000) (stating extreme emotional disturbance is
available as mitigating defense for intentional murder for situations which deemed
worthy of mercy or leniency for defendant). See generally People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d
704, 706 (N.Y. 1983) (noting intentional murder differs from depraved mind murder
because it is intent to cause death on conscious level).
109 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (creating mitigating factor of extreme
emotional disturbance for intentional murder); see also Fardan, 628 N.E.2d at 44
(applying extreme emotional disturbance only to intentional murder and not depraved
indifference murder). See generally Register, 457 N.E.2d at 706 (ruling intoxication can
not be used as mitigating defense for reckless crimes including depraved mind murder).
110 See People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 206 (N.Y. 1986) (noting depravity of
mind is element of depraved indifference murder); see also People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d
204, 206 (N.Y. 2002) (ruling conduct of defendant met requirement of depraved mind
which was requirement for depraved mind murder). See generally Register, 457 N.E.2d at
707 (stating that in addition to element of conduct producing grave risk of death,
depraved mind murder requires depraved indifference to human life).
111 See People v. Thacker, 570 N.Y.S.2d 516, 520 (App. Div. 1991) (stating depraved
indifference homicide is characterized by "unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity,
or actions exhibiting a high degree of wantonness"); see also People v. Magliato, 494
N.Y.S.2d 307, 310 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that "there must be an unmotivated
wickedness so great as to be indicative of depravity"). See generally People v. Northrup,
442 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (App. Div. 1981) (writing "depraved indifference to human life is
characterized by unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity, or actions exhibiting a
high degree of wantonness").
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disturbance provides both an understandable motivation as well
as a mitigating factor that would negate finding a "depraved
mind."11 2 The court in Farden however, found such inquiries
unnecessary, holding that the position in the statute places such
an affirmative defense only under intentional murder.113 Here
again we are presented with a question of fundamental fairness,
whereby an actor who is acting under an extreme emotional
disturbance is to be punish with the same condemnation as in
intentional murder, with out the benefit of the same mitigating
factors when he is found to be acting with depraved indifference
to human life.
What we are left with is a state of confusion. Although the
intention was to "limit and crystallize"1 14 the mental states in
the criminal law, "the uncertainties are greater now than at the
time of Darry and much greater than at common law."115 What
significance then can we give to the comment by the revision
commission that the crime of depraved indifference murder is
"substantially a restatement" of the old law? The court on one
hand goes so far as to say that the crime of depraved indifference
murder requires something more than recklessness, even using
words such as "wanton" "devoid of regard for human life."116 Yet,
on the other hand the court has refused to look at such
mitigating elements as the defendant's extreme emotional
distress or even the actor's subjective mental state when
determining the element of "depraved indifference."117
112 See Depraved, supra note 13, at 457 (1990) (noting that defense of extreme
emotional disturbance is built into understanding of crime); see also People v.
Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497, 498 (N.Y. 1924) (ruling that defendant's disregard of
knowledge on conscious level that act would cause death was required for depraved mind
murder conviction). See generally Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854) (holding
depraved mind murder statute required act to be committed on conscious level).
113 See Fardan, 628 N.E.2d at 44 (holding extreme emotional disturbance is not
defense to depraved indifference murder); see also Harris, 740 N.E.2d at 229 (noting
defense of extreme emotional disturbance can be used to mitigate intentional murder
charge). See generally Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (refusing to allow intoxication as extreme
emotional disturbance to mitigate depraved mind murder).
114 Register, 457 N.E.2d at 708.
115 GEGAN, supranote 4, at 437.
116 People v. Fenner, 463 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that depraved
indifference murder requires conduct so wanton and devoid of regard for human life so as
to be treated with same societal condemnation as intentional murder); see also Register,
457 N.E.2d at 706 (clarifying depravity of mind to mean "a wanton indifference to human
life). See generally Jernatowski, 144 N.E. at 498 (holding act of firing several shots into
home demonstrated "wicked and depraved mind").
117 See Fardan,628 N.E.2d at 44 (holding affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance is inapplicable to crime of depraved indifference murder); see also Register,
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E. Merger of Intentional and Depraved Indifference Murder
The result of this confusion is the further expansion of the
crime to include practically all homicides.
In People v.
Sanchez 118 the Court of Appeals upheld a conviction over staunch
opposition by three members of the court, holding that "shooting
into the victim's torso at point blank range presented such a
transcendent risk of causing death that it readily meets the level
of manifested depravity needed to establish murder under Penal
Law 125.25(2)."119
In reaching it decision, the court noted that since Sanchez and
the victim had a social relationship, and Sanchez fired only one
shot before fleeing the scene, the jury was free to reject this act
as an intentional killing.12 0 Once the jury rejected intent, the
court reasoned that there was ample support that the firing of a
gun at the victim at a distance of less than 18 inches permitted
the jury to rationally "conclude that the defendant demonstrated
an indifference to human life so depraved as to be deserving the
same punishment as intentional murder."121 The majority even
seemed to draw strength from evidence that this crime may have
been intentional in nature, articulating, "purposeful homicide
itself is the ultimate manifestation of indifference to the value of
human life."12 2
The court also found that there was no need for a showing that
the defendant's reckless conduct was of a "brutal, barbaric or
savage nature" because the crime in this case is "manifestly
extreme and unjustified."12 3 To give weight to this point the

457 N.E.2d at 706 (refusing to allow intoxication as extreme emotional disturbance to
mitigate depraved mind murder). See generally Harris, 740 N.E.2d at 229 (stating
legislature allowed defense of extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate intentional
murder to manslaughter in first degree).
118 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002).
119 Id. at 206.
120 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206 (noting defendant's good relations with victim and
that only one shot was fired); see also People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. 1989)
(noting determination of whether defendant acted with depraved indifference to human
life is performed by trier of facts). See generally Jernatowski, 144 N.E at 498-99 (holding
act of firing several bullets into home sufficient to justify jury's finding of depraved mind
murder).
121 Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 211.
122 Idat211.
123 Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 208 (discussing "circumstances manifesting extreme
depravity").
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majority cited the case of People v. Roe, 124 in which the
defendant's conviction was upheld without a showing that the
defendant's state of mind was "uncommonly evil."125 However,
as we have seen the standards articulated by the Court in Roe
have been met with some troubling criticism. 126 In any event, in
Roe, the depravity of the defendant's actions was objectively
proven by the fact that the defendant loaded a mix of "live" and
"dummy" shells into a shot gun and fired it at the victim.1 27 The
fact that the defendant was not aware of the order in which he
loaded the shells into the gun and that he would play such a
"game," presented objective circumstances that would show a
depraved indifference to human life. Moreover, in Roe there was
never any evidence presented by the prosecution that would lead
the jury to believe that this was an intentional killing.12 8 In fact,
the defendant in Roe did not intent to kill the victim at all and
was surprised and dismayed that the gun discharged a live round
when he pulled the trigger.129
Yet, how does one reconcile the interpretation of the crime
articulated in Sanchez, which now encompasses acts that are
intentional, with the statement that the new law is
"substantially a restatement" of the old law? This interesting
piece of legislative history, which has been stressed very heavily
by the members of the dissent, seems to be largely overlooked by
the majority of the court. Still, the majority found that the
crimes of intentional and depraved indifference murder were
clearly distinguishable because of their differing mental
states.130 The majority held that with proper instruction from
124 542 N.E.2d 610 (1989).
125 Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 212 (analogizing Sanchez with Roe and rejecting dissent's
proposed formulation of mens rea requirement).
126 See Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615-20 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (raising some troubling
questions about court's decision); see also People v. White, 590 N.E.2d 236, 238 (N.Y.
1992) (distinguishing Roe and focusing on defendant's mens rea). See generally People v.
Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C. J., concurring) (emphasizing
modern focus on mens rea, rather than categorical "homicide is homicide is homicide"
approach).
127 See Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 612-14 (discussing facts of case).
128 See id at 613. (characterizing incident as "macabre game," limiting analysis to
"whether the crime conduct creates the very substantial risk of death necessary for
depraved indifference" without expressly considering whether killing was intentional).
129 See Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 616 (Bellacosa, J. dissenting) (giving detailed account of
defendant's emotional state immediately following shooting).
130 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 209-10 (distinguishing between intentional or
purposeful killing and depraved indifference killing, and noting that modern formulations
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the trial judge, the jury would be able to adequately separate the
two crimes so that the judicial safeguard of appellate review
could prevent any merger of the two crimes. 13 1 The dissenters
were not so confident and in three separate dissents Judges
Smith, Ciparick and Rosenblatt expressed their concern over the
broadening scope of this crime.1 32
III. CONCERNS FOLLOWING THIS EXPANDED INTERPRETATION

A. Vagueness
Following this series of decisions a number of concerns have
arisen relating to the direction of the modern statute. One of the
major criticisms that have been articulated concerning the
modern interpretation of depraved indifference
murder
surrounds the meaning of "under circumstances evincing
depraved indifference."1 3 3 As we have seen, this is not the mens
rea, but a qualitative analysis made by the jury of the
surrounding context of the act. 134 Under this theory the jury is
asked to look at the objective circumstances of the defendant's
reckless act, and determine whether such conduct is so depraved
as to be treated on the same level as an intentional killing. 13 5
of "depraved indifference" do not require proof of "uncommonly evil and morally perverse"
mens rea in addition to objectively depravedly indifferent conduct).
131 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 209 (noting that statutory safeguard of appellate
review will prevent merger of two crimes).
132 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 213-35 (Smith, J. dissenting) (echoing concerns raised
by J. Bellacosa's Roe dissent that de-emphasis of mens rea requirement in depraved
indifference murder unduly expands crime).
133 People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 711 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "depraved indifference" was intended by Legislature to constitute culpable
state of mind); see also Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (remarking that
tangible meaning of depraved indifference is "elusive"). See generally People v. Poplis, 281
N.E.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that "the murder definition requires conduct with
'depraved indifference' to 'human life' plus recklessness").
134 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (noting depraved indifference to human life is not
mens rea); see also Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 612 (stating additional element "is a qualitative
judgment made by the trier of fact"). See generally Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 207-08 (stating
that "objective circumstances of exceptionally high, unjustified risk of death constitute the
primary means by which the Legislature differentiated between the reckless state of mind
sufficient to establish the mental culpability of manslaughter and the extreme
recklessness of murder under [the] Penal Law").
135 See Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 612 ("Evidence of the actor's subjective mental state,
however, is not pertinent to a determination of the additional element required for
depraved indifference murder"); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at 706 (noting that
defendant's asserted mens rea is misplaced in this analysis: "objective circumstances [are
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The objective-circumstances approach has the advantage that it
is an assessment that the jury is able to make by placing the
highest societal condemnation upon deadly actions of extreme
depravity, based on the surrounding circumstances in which the
act was committed.136

Yet, if the courts refuse to look further than the face of the
1967 law, we find that the legislature, though the statute has
provided no guidance into what circumstances evince such
depraved indifference,1 37 and therefore no guidance as to what an
appellate court should use as a guide to determine whether a
reasonable jury could find such depraved indifference.1 38 Juries
using the circumstances approach have convicted persons for
depraved indifference murder where the circumstances
surrounding the act have showed an unmitigated wickedness,
such as denying a child adequate sustenance until it starved to
death,139 firing one shot into a crowded street corner, 140 playing a
game of vehicular "cat and mouse" on a suburban street, 14 1 or
not subject] to being negatived by evidence of defendant's intoxication"). See generally
Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 207 (emphasizing objective analysis of created risk).
136 See MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 793 (noting that under this approach, jurors
would be able to make determination that certain acts would warrant higher offense,
while avoiding blurring issue with inquiries into defendant's mens rea); see also N.Y.
PENAL Art. 130 (providing for elevation of sex offenses to "aggravated" status depending
on objective circumstances surrounding act). See generally Poplis, 281 N.E.2d at 168
(noting jury's application of objective standard to find that continued beatings resulted in
child's death as fitting "within the accepted understanding of the kind of recklessness
involving 'a depraved indifference to human life').
137 See N.Y. PENAL § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2003) (defining second degree murder, in
relevant part, as killing in which a person "under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person").
138 See MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 795 (noting circumstances approach does not
provide any guidance for appellate court to determine whether "reasonable jury" could
have reached its conclusion); see also State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me. 1980)
(cautioning prosecutors that vague objective-circumstances approach is not to be used as
"catchall" for securing easy murder convictions). See generally People v. Rodriguez, 888
P.2d 278, 283 (Colo. 1994) (discussing similarly worded depraved-indifference murder
statute that was declared unconstitutionally vague by Colorado courts and was
subsequently clarified by the legislature).
139 See, e.g., People v. Word, 689 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (App. Div. 1999) (employing
objective approach to defendant's depriving three-and-a-half month old child of food until
child starved to death, rather than considering mens rea).
140 See, e.g., People v. Jin Wai, 724 N.Y.S.2d 824, 824 (App. Div. 2001) (finding grave
risk when defendant fired gun into crowded street corner); see also People v. Callender,
760 N.Y.S.2d 408, 408 (App. Div. 2003) (stating unequivocally that firing into crowd is
"classic example of depraved indifference murder"). See generally People v. Register, 457
N.E.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. 1983) (noting depraved indifference at defendant's shooting into
crowded barroom).
141 See, e.g., People v. Esposito, 627 N.Y.S.2d 739, 739 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that
evidence at trial revealed defendant and decedent engaged in "vehicular cat and mouse
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firing a shot into a group of people.14 2 Each of these examples
seems to be in line with the common law understanding of
general malice.143 Although each portrays conduct that presents
a grave risk of death and that is directed at an individual in the
case of the child or the general public in the other examples, each
illustrates indifference as to whether or not death will occur.
However, there have also been cases where juries have
convicted defendants under the depraved mind murder statute
where the circumstances tend to support action that is solely
intentional in nature. Such cases include killing a victim by
striking him on the back of the head with a baseball bat,144
throwing a baby against a wall,145 strangling the victim to death
7
after an assault,146 or firing two shots into the victim's chest.14

game"). But see State v. Noles, No. W2002-01558-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1079, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that high speed "cat and mouse
game" resulting in fatality constituted only vehicular homicide); State v. Parker, 806 P.2d
1241, 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming vehicular manslaughter conviction of
knowing participant in game of "cat and mouse").
142 See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 627 N.Y.S.2d 395, 395 (App. Div. 1995) (convicting
after defendant whirled around and fired shot into "group of people following closely
behind"); see also People v. Baptiste, 760 N.Y.S.2d 594, 598 (App. Div. 2003) (finding
depraved indifference when defendant shot multiple times into crowded car). See
generally People v. Watson, 753 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (App. Div. 2002) (stating that
defendant's act of firing shots into crowd outside bar supported charge of depraved
indifference murder).
143 See generally State v. Atkins, 87 S.E.2d 507, 509 (N.C. 1955) (affirming
correctness of Knotts definition of general malice when used as jury instruction); State v.
Burton, 90 S.E. 561, 562 (N.C. 1916) (clarifying that general malice may be shown by
threats and premeditation); State v. Knotts, 83 S.E. 972, 977 (N.C. 1914) (defining
general malice as "wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, a black and diabolical heart,
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief").
144 See, e.g., People v. Rios, 658 N.Y.S.2d 579, 579 (App. Div. 1997) (convicting killeri
of victim by striking him once on head with baseball bat); see also People v. Halloway, 516
N.Y.S.2d 553, 553 (App. Div. 1987) (affirming second degree manslaughter conviction of
appellee who killed man with a single blow to head by wooden bed slat). See generally
State v. Anderson, No. 97, 1992 Del. LEXIS 416, at *5 (Del. 1992) (equating baseball bat
to bludgeon, noting that as such they "pose unusual potential for the infliction of death").
145 See, e.g., People v. Singleton, 623 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding
conviction after defendant repeatedly threw his two year old baby against wall); see also
State v. Wright, No. 01CO1-9503-CC-00093, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3, at *6 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996) (ruling that repeatedly hurling fifteen month old infant against wall
constitutes second degree murder). See generally Covington v. State, 322 N.E.2d 705, 707
(Ind. 1975) (inferring malice where infant was killed by being thrown against wall).
146 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 613 N.Y.S.2d 284, 284 (App. Div. 1994) (upholding
conviction after defendant assaulted and strangled his wife to death). See generally Reed
v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 203 (Fla. 1990) (finding intent to kill where appellant raped,
beat, and stabbed victim twelve times in the throat); People v. Renoso, 241 P.2d 628, 630
(Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (noting that severe beating followed by strangulation creates an
inference of intent).
147 See, e.g., People v. Helen, 742 N.Y.S.2d 640, 640 (App. Div. 2002) (noting
defendant discharged two shots into chest of victim, though defendant claimed he did not
think the gun was loaded); see also People v. Nestman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div.
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Although each of these examples present circumstances of
"unmitigated wickedness" this second set of examples present
actions that more closely resemble a specific intent to harm
48
another and not general malice.1
It is important to note that the strongest type of depraved

49
indifference to human life is the intentional taking of life.1

However, the inclusion of these classes of cases with the
depraved mind murder statute is beyond that intended by the

legislature.15o

Depraved indifference was never intended to

encompass an act intended to seriously harm another individual,

either under today's codification or the common law. At common
law, Stephen's classification of murder all required the actor to
posses a kind of "wicked mind," one that was subjectively aware
of the risk but committed the act in spite of that risk.151 Yet his
classifications of "malice aforethought" differed because of the

1997) (stating that intent is properly inferred where defendant shot victim inhead with
rifle). See generally State v. Wright, No. 53733, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1806, at "11 (Ct.
App. 1988) (calling evidence of intent "overwhelming" where appellee shot victim twice in
chest at point blank range).
148 See People v. Lerma, 239 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (attempting to
distinguish specific intent from general malice by stating that specific intent entails
"some intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires"); see
also Bryan A. Liang & Wendy Macfarlane, Murder by Omission: Child Abuse and the
Passive Parent, 36 HARV. J. ON. LEGIS. 397, 412 (1999) (noting that specific intent
requires intent to produce specific result, whereas general malice requires only intention
to commit action). See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
specific intent as "the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later
charged with.").
149 See People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 211 (N.Y. 2002) (stating intentional taking
of life is ultimate manifestation of depraved indifference); see also State v. Pindale, 592
A.2d 300, 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (explaining that "purposeful or knowing
homicide demonstrates precise ... indifference to the value of human life"). See generally
United States v. Vandenack, 15 M.J. 230, 233 (C.M.A.. 1983) (noting that even criminal
acts which are only likely to deprive one of life evidence depraved indifference).
150 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. 1983) (stating depraved
indifference murder "is not and never has been a substitute for intentional murder); see
also Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 324 (echoing the Register language). See generally Brooks v.
Kelly, No. 88-CV-0631E, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12608, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying
petitioner's challenge that his depraved murder conviction was substitute for intentional
murder).
151 See STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 37 (noting that actor must have knowledge of risk
created by his conduct in order to be guilty of murder); see also People v. Maghzal, 427
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "an intent to create a very high risk
of death with the knowledge that the act probably will cause death or great bodily harm"
is element of common law murder). See generally State v. Keele, 644 S.W.2d 435, 439
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding common law murder charge where defendant
exhibited that he had "no hesitation whatsoever about committing crimes in which the
risk to human life is high").
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way in which that malice was manifested.152 With intentional
acts of murder, the malice was express; the "wicked mind" was
apparent by the intentional taking of life.1 53 However, with
depraved indifference the malice is inferred by the nature of the
actor's conduct because intent is lacking.154 Early judges and
lawmakers in New York understood this notion and created a law
that was a reflection of the common law understanding of the
crime. Today's codification of murder in the second degree is no
different. The two theories of murder were never intended to
overlap or encompass the same type of conduct, the revision
commission was created to remove "ambiguity and duplication"
in the law, and the three subdivision of murder reflect three
separate aspects of the crime. 15 5
Although modern courts have stressed that depraved
indifference murder is not a proxy for intentional murder,156 they
have not felt compelled to examine neither the common law
origins of the statute nor the long history of interpretation that
152 See STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 39 (describing four different categories to establish
malice aforethought); see also Alan C. Michaels, Rationales of a Criminal Law Then and
Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 75 (2000) [hereinafter
Rationales] (establishing four categories: express malice, felony murder, serious bodily
injury murder, and depraved indifference murder). See generally Sean J. Kealy, Hunting
the Dragon: Reforming the MassachusettsMurder Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 207
(2001) (expounding on aforementioned categories).
153 See McInerney v. Berman, 621 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1980) (instructing jury that
malice may be properly inferred by the use of deadly weapon); see also State v. Childers,
563 P.2d 999, 1005 (Kan. 1977) (noting that malice is self evident in the use of deadly
weapon against another). See generally State v. Hardin, 103 S.E. 557, 557 (S.C. 1920)
(instructing that malice is fairly attributed to intentional killing with deadly weapon).
154 See STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 47 (stating that intent to cause death need not be
present in order to find person guilty of depraved indifference murder); see also State v.
Casey, No. 20010622, 2003 Utah LEXIS 88, at *35 (Utah 2003) (deeming erroneous jury
instruction that attributed purposeful or knowing mens rea to charge of depraved
indifference). See generally Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory
Proposal, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 590 (1999) (suggesting that flexibility of
having both intentional and depraved murder statutes is advantageous).
155 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 2004) (subdividing second degree
murder into intentional, depraved indifference, and felony murder categories); see also
Sweet v. Bennet, 353 F.3d 135, *22-39 (2d Cir. 2003) (exploring tensions between
intentional and reckless mens rea of New York second degree murder statute). See
generally Robert M. Byrn, Homicide Under the Proposed New York Law, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 173, 177 (1965) (highlighting New York's choice to employ "exclusionary test of lack
of premeditation and deliberation" in formulating three categories).
156 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. 1983) (stating depraved
indifference murder "is not and never has been a substitute for intentional murder); see
also People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 216 (N.Y. 2002) (echoing Register language). See
generally Brooks v. Kelly, No. 88-CV-0631E, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12608 at *12
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying petitioner's challenge that his depraved murder conviction was
substitute for intentional murder).
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has led to the modern codification. The courts look back no
further than Register for their understanding of the crime. As a
result, we are again confronted with a problem that has been
echoed since Judge Selden's opinion in Darry and in the dissents
that have been written since Register, that depraved indifference
murder can be expanded to all homicides, so long as a jury is
willing to find depraved indifference.157
This has led to the modern statute being challenged on the
basis that it is unconstitutionally vague. However, in People v.
Johnson158 the Court of Appeals rejected this challenge stating,
"conduct with depraved indifference to human life is well
understood."159 To reach this conclusion the Court of Appeals
relied upon its decision in People v. Cole,160 in which the court
noted that Register did not unsettle the well-established common
law understanding of the "depraved indifference" element, but
merely clarified the "element as objective aggravating
circumstance rather than a part of the crime's mens rea." 161
Yet, if Register did not unsettle the common law understanding
of "depraved indifference," subsequent cases have done just that.
By disregarding of the idea of general malice as the purpose for
the crimes very existence and the refusal to examine the
subjective intent of the defendant, today's interpretation of
depraved indifference murder is quite different from the crime
157 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854) (theorizing that "there is scarcely a
case of manslaughter which upon this construction may not be brought within the
definition of murder... provided a jury can be found to say that act which produced death
evinced a 'depraved mind, regardless of human life"'); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at 711
(Jasen, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority's opinion "eviscerates the distinction between
manslaughter in the second degree and murder in the second degree"). See generally
People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 615 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (stating "this
result finalizes the obliteration of the classical demarcation between murder and
manslaughter in this State.").
158 662 N.E.2d 1066 (N.Y. 1996).
159 Johnson, 662 N.E.2d at 1067. See People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167, 88 (N.Y. 1972)
(describing conduct which has been rather well understood at common law to involve
"something more serious than mere recklessness alone which has had an incidental tragic
result"). See generally Darry, 10 N.Y. at 136 (discussing common law root of depraved
indifference murder and statute's legislative history and intent).
160 652 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1995).
161 Cole, 652 N.E.2d at 913. Cf. Waters v. State, 443 A.2d 500, 504 (Sup. Ct. Del.
1982) (interpreting words "cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference to human life," in
Delaware statute as "intending to define a particular state of mind which must be found
to have existed in the defendant at the time the crime was committed-the mens rea"),
with People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 219-20 (N.Y. 2002) (Smith, J., dissenting)
(pointing to New York Legislature's clear intent to restate law and not to abrogate State's
decisional law on requisite mens rea for depraved indifference murder).
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articulated under the common law. Sanchez represents the
farthest move by the courts in diminishing the common law
understanding that depraved indifference murder did not apply
to cases where the evidence presented an intentional killing
directed at a particular individual.162
Courts in other states that have been confronted with the
circumstances approach have come to different conclusions about
the specificity of their depraved indifference murder statutes.
Colorado declared its state's depraved indifference murder
statute unconstitutional for vagueness.1 63 In contrast, Maine's
highest court recognized the potential abuse of the circumstances
approach and warned prosecutors that depraved indifference
murder constitutes a narrow and limited exception to the
fundamental principle of the Criminal Code.164
B. Advantage for Prosecutors
For Prosecutors, the expansion of the scope of the depraved
indifference murder statute now seen since People v. Sanchez
provides a marked advantage by affording a fallback provision to
achieve a murder conviction. This is possible because under N.Y.
CPL § 300.50, "if an indictment contains two inconsistent
counts... the court may submit both counts in the alternative
and authorize the jury to convict upon one or the other depending
upon its findings of fact."'165 Since actions falling under the
162 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 220-31 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (repeatedly
charging majority with making "ordinary recklessness" sufficient to establish depraved
indifference murder); see also People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. 1983) (noting
dissent's fear that majority's holding would "result in wholesale depraved mind murder
prosecutions for what are essentially intentional murders"). See generally Depraved,
supra note 13, at 430 (1990) (discussing problem of intent and depraved indifference
murder as having already existed more than decade before Sanchez decision).
163 See People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (striking down Colorado murder
statute on vagueness grounds); see also People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1223 (Colo.
1988) (finding Colorado's revised murder statute to pass constitutional muster). See
generally Michaels, supra note 14, at 795 n.47 (discussing the case of People v. Marcy).
164 See State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 541 (Me. 1980) (issuing this warning but
recognizing excess of caution prosecuting attorney may seek from grand jury an
indictment charging murder in alternative form of depraved indifference as well as
intentional and knowing murder); see also State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166, 1173 (1979)
(pointing out that purpose of statute is to deal with those few instances in which his
conduct created such high tendency to produce death that law attributes to him highest
degree of blameworthiness) (emphasis added). See generally Michaels, supra note 14, at
795 (noting other states have had to warn prosecutors not to take advantage of broadness
of depraved indifference murder law).
165 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50 (McKinney 2003).
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depraved indifference murder statute are treated with the same

societal condemnation as intentional murder in the second
degree, 166 they are also punished with the same degree of
severity.167 Therefore, with the scope of depraved indifference
murder now expanded to include acts that are intentional in
nature, prosecutors will be given a double opportunity to convict
for murder. 168
However, this is not a new concern that presents itself with the
court's decision in Sanchez. Rather, this issue has been raised
for over twenty years as the scope of the depraved indifference
murder statute has been expanded.169 In both Register and in
Roe, the dissents have warned of "some very disproportionate
miscarriages of justice"170 stemming from this prosecutorial
advantage. In New York, Judge Rosenblatt found this trend to
be most startling since Register.171 According to the Judge's
statistics, there has been a substantial increase since 1989 in the
number of indictments that charged both intentional and

166 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 706 (stating that in depraved indifference murder
"conduct through reckless was equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder" ); see also
Greenburg, NEW YORK CRIMINAL LAW, § 6:13 (noting "depraved indifference murder is
deemed 'equal in blameworthiness' to intentional murder").
167 Both intentional and depraved indifference murder are classified under the same
statute, N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.25 as class A felonies and both carry a maximum sentence of
25 years to life. Cf. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.15 (reckless manslaughter) with § 125.25(2)
(depraved mind murder). In the Model Penal Code, depraved heart murder and reckless
manslaughter involve the same criteria and the distinction between them is one of degree.
See Model Penal Code § 210.2 cmt. 4, at 21-22.
168 See People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 224 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J.,
dissenting) (noting that trend of twin-count indictments of intentional and depraved
indifference murder will only continue with holding of court); see also People v. Weems,
481 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 1984) (upholding trial court's refusal to charge jury on
manslaughter in second degree as lesser included offense of second degree murder
because facts could not support finding of recklessness). See generally People v. Gallagher,
508 N.E.2d 909, 909 (N.Y. 1987) (clarifying "where a defendant is charged with a single
homicide in an indictment containing one count of intentional murder and one count of
depraved mind murder both counts may be submitted to the jury in the alternative").
169 See Michaels, supra note 14, at 795 (noting other states have had warn
prosecutors not to take advantage of broadness of depraved indifference murder law).
170 People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 619 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
171 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 223 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (noting
statistic increase in charging of depraved indifference murder) (citing People v. Lyons,
721 N.Y.S.2d 179 (2001)) (affirming depraved indifference murder conviction of man who
shot his lover's husband in chest and head during a struggle); see also People v. Sawyer,
711 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming the defendant's depraved indifference
murder conviction where the "defendant deliberately thrust a steak knife into (the
victim's) chest with significant force").

906

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.18:3

depraved indifference murder - justifying the warning uttered in
previous dissents.172
What seems to be most troubling about this trend is the
continuing overlap of two crimes with mens rea elements that
the Court of Appeals has found to be mutually exclusive.17 3 One
cannot, at the same time, act both intentionally and recklessly
and thus a jury cannot find a defendant guilty of both intentional
and depraved indifference murder. However, since the jury is
permitted to examine both counts in the alternative,174 the effect
of this practice is that the jury is confronted with two theories of
the homicide. The prosecution, faced with evidence that points to
an intentional killing need not prove the subjective intent of the
defendant to obtain a conviction for murder.
Rather, this
practice allows prosecutors to meet the lesser mens rea standard
of recklessness, then present evidence of circumstances
surrounding the act that would show a "depraved indifference to
human life" in order to convict for murder.175
172 Judges have noted that the warning of the dissent in Roe and Register have come
true. See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 224 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). It has also been pointed
out that the Appellate Divisions have considered over 100 convictions stemming from
twin-count indictments, the vast majority in the last 10 years. Id. at n.14. See generally
BUREAU OF STATISTICAL SERVICES, N.Y. ST. DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES, N.Y. STATE
FELONY PROCESSING PRELIMINARY REPORT, Jan.-Dec. 1999 (Action Type by Offense
Category) (Feb. 4, 2000).
173 See People v. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that because
intentional and reckless are mutually exclusive, defendant may not be convicted of both
depraved indifference murder and intentional murder for same act); see also Kenneth W.
Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179,
1179 (1989) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988)) (discussing whether one can possess requisite
mental states of both intent and recklessness at once in context of now-famous Goetz
trial). See generally People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 206 (N.Y.1986) (holding that
justification may be asserted as defense to manslaughter, as well as depraved indifference
murder, because they involve same mens rea).
174 See Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909 (stating that both depraved and intentional
theories of murder may be submitted to jury but only in alternative); see also People v.
Robinson, 538 N.Y.S.2d 122, 122-24 (App. Div. 1989), affd, 74 N.Y.2d 879 (1990)
(explaining that when two inconsistent counts of an indictment are presented to jury, they
must be submitted in alternative to each other). See generally N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §
300.50 (2003) (asserting that "the court in its discretion may, in addition to submitting
the greatest offense which it is required to submit, submit in the alternative any lesser
included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a
finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the
greater.").
175 See People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 224 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J.,
dissenting) (discussing use of lesser mens rea to convict); see also People v. Roe, 542
N.E.2d 610, 618-19 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (contending that under this
scheme, prosecutors are given an "unjust opportunity for a top count murder conviction
and an almost certain fallback for conviction on the lesser included crime of
manslaughter"). See generally People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 713 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen,
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That appears to be what had happened in Sanchez, where the
prosecution had failed to prove the subjective intent of the
defendant's actions although the evidence of the crime pointed to
an intentional killing. In reviewing the case, the Court of
Appeals dismissed intent as the only mens rea presented on the
theory that the shooting seemed "sudden, spontaneous and not
well-designed to cause imminent death."176 Yet, with this in
mind it seems impossible for the court to then uphold the
conviction of the defendant for a crime which calls for conduct
that is so wanton and blameworthy as to warrant the same
liability as the law imposes intentional murderers.17 7
Further, and more problematically, Judge Rosenblatt notes
that under this practice, the jury may be more willing to convict
under the depraved indifference murder standard because the
implication of a lesser mens rea element might be perceived as a
lesser crime.178 Commentators have taken note of the close
relation in definitions between depraved indifference murder and
simple manslaughter1 79 and the jury rejecting intentional
murder may believe that they are convicting the defendant for a
J., dissenting) (warning that prosecutors will be able to obtain convictions based on lesser
mens rea of recklessness).
176 Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206 (2002).
177 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206 (2002) (noting that defendant's conduct was
"manifestly destined to result in Range's death as to deserve same societal condemnation
as purposeful homicide."); see also Robyn Mendelson, New York State Constitutional
Decisions: 1999 Compilation:Double Jeopardy: Supreme Court: Bronx County: People v.
Mercado, 16 TOURO L. REV. 513, 516 (2000) (stating that depraved indifference murder
and intentional murder are not same because they possess different mental states). See
generally Richard C. Wesley, Voting and Opinion Patternson the New York Court Center
for Judicial Process, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1067, 1071-72 (2003) (observing that prosecutors
will be able to obtain convictions for intentional murders by proving lesser reckless
offense).
178 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 211 (commenting that jurors may confuse depraved
indifference murder as lesser charge than intentional murder); see also People v. Hafeez,
792 N.E.2d 1060, 1061-63 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that trial evidence of defendant's conduct
was consistent with intentional murder and not depraved indifference murder). See
generally People v. Stephens, 769 N.Y.S.2d 249, 254 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that jury
instruction was proper because mere recklessness is not enough to convict defendant
under depraved indifference murder and rather jury must find he acted recklessly "under
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" that created "a grave risk
of serious physical injury or death to a person... and thereby caused the death of such
person.").
179 See GEGAN, supra note 13, at 439 (noting similarities between manslaughter and
depraved indifference murder); see also Michael H. Hoffeimer, Murder and Manslaughter
in Mississippi: Unintentional Killings, 71 MIss. L.J. 35, 110-11 (2001) (discussing
difficulties in interpreting what "depraved heart" means). See generally Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 118-22 (1996) (explaining
different approaches courts take in defining recklessness required for depraved heart
murder).
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Still, the majority in Sanchez rejected this
lesser crime.
argument, stressing procedural safeguards and proper jury
instruction. Yet, this seems to be a questionable response.i8 0 As
we have seen, the Court of Appeals has had trouble concretely
defining the mens rea element of the crime, positing varying
degrees of recklessness at different times. 18 ' How is it that the
court is so confident that the jury will readily perceive an idea
that the courts have had difficulty in explaining?
Finally, with the shift toward upholding depraved indifference
murder convictions for intentional acts, how then do we also
reconcile Farden? If depraved indifference murder encompasses
acts that are also intentional in nature, will the affirmative
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" be permitted or will
the court allow another marked advantage to prosecutors? If the
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" does not apply and if
acts intentional in nature are permitted under depraved
indifference murder, it appears that prosecutors will be able to
circumvent the defense by simply charging depraved indifference
as opposed to intentional murder. The effect would be yet
another marked advantage for prosecutors.
IV. PEOPLE V. HAFEEZ182

However, Sanchez would not end the debate and one year after
the Court of Appeals decided the case of People v. Sanchez,
blurring the lines between intentional and depraved indifference
murder, the Court would again find itself faced with the question
of how far to expand this crime. However, here the Court of
Appeals would take a first step in preventing any further
expansion of the crime of depraved indifference murder.
180 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 211 (noting appellate review will provide necessary
safeguards); see also People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 711-12 (N.Y. 1983) (observing
difficulties in defining mens rea for depraved indifference murder). See generally People v.
Robinson, 538 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (App. Div. 1989) (stating when charges of depraved
indifference murder and intentional murder are submitted to jury that they could find
defendant guilty of either depraved indifference murder or intentional murder).
181 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 707 (noting that only mens rea of crime of depraved
indifference murder is "recklessness," though other courts have interpreted the crime to
required a higher standard of recklessness); see also People v. Fenner, 463 N.E.2d 617,
618 (N.Y. 1984) (noting crime requires "conduct beyond being reckless"). See generally
People v. Fink, 674 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App. Div. 1998) (stating "depraved indifference is
not akin to mere recklessness").
182 792 N.E.2d 1060 (2003).
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In People v. Hafeez, the Court of Appeals was faced with a
defendant who conspired with another to lure the victim, with
whom the two had a prior confrontation, out of a Queens bar.183
When the victim came outside, Hafeez threw the victim into a
wall and stood by as his friend fatally stabbed the victim in the
heart. 8 4 At trial, Hafeez claimed that although he knew his
friend had a knife he never thought his friend would use it.185 A
jury acquitted him of intentional murder, but convicted Hafeez
on the theory of depraved indifference.1 86
On appeal, his
conviction was overturned after the court found that the evidence
at trial was consistent only with the crime of intentional murder
and that no reasonable jury could find that the proper mental
state existed for depraved indifference murder.187
In declining to further expand the crime of depraved
indifference murder, the Court's decision in Hafeez presents a
turning point for the Court of Appeals. Yet, whatever Hafeez
does do to limit the application of the crime of depraved
indifference murder from being applicable to homicides involving
a well thought out, planned killing of a particular individual,
Sanchez remains the high water mark for the converging
definitions of depraved indifference and intentional murder. 18 8 It
183 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1061 (describing events leading to homicide); see also
Austin Fenner, Second Man Guilty in Stab Slay, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 2001, at 3
(articulating that co-defendants and victim were involved in pool hall fight). See generally
Jill Miller, Depraved Indifference Murder Conviction Reversed, DAILY REC. OF
ROCHESTER, June 25, 2003 (stating that victim threw pool ball at defendant's eye).
184 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1061(noting planned nature of crime); see also FENNER,
supra note 183, at 3 (stating that Hafeez pushed victim against wall and Hafeez's friend
stabbed him in heart). See generally MILLER, supra note 183 (remarking that Hafeez
moved aside to let friend take over).
185 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1061 (noting that defendant claimed he was aware of
weapon but not that co-defendant would use it); see also Austin Fenner, Crying Killer Gets
17 Years for Slay, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 3, 2001, at 1 (quoting Hafeez as saying "If I
had known what Fredricks had in his mind, I wouldn't have taken part."). See generally
MILLER, supra note 183 (stating that Hafeez claimed he did not know his friend was going
to use knife).
186 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1061-62 (noting outcome of trial); see also MILLER,
supra note 183 (commenting that defendant was found guilty of depraved indifference
murder). See generally Paul Schectman, No Fireworks But Noteworthy Precedents Set,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 2, 2003, at s5 (stating that Hafeez was acquitted of intentional murder).
187 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1062 (describing claims on appeal); see also MILLER,
supra note 183 (noting that there was no valid line of reasoning to support requisite mens
rea for depraved indifference murder). See generally SCHECTMAN, supra note 186, at s5
(quoting Ciparick's opinion which stated that what occurred was a "quintessentially
intentional attack directed solely at the victim").
188 See People v. Stephens, 769 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253-54, (App. Div. 2003) (finding that
jury instruction for depraved indifference murder was consistent with Sanchez). But see
People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (2003) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (articulating
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remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeals will go further
and limit its holding in Sanchez.
Even now, the Court of Appeals must struggle to defend its
decision in the Sanchez case. Judge Ciparick, who dissented in
Sanchez,189 was forced to enter facts about the case that did not
appear in the Court's decision to rationalize the Court's holding
in Sanchez and to distinguish that decision from Hafeez.
Ciparick noted that Sanchez "involved the sudden shooting of a
victim by a defendant who reached around from behind a door
and fired into an area where children were playing, presenting a
heightened risk of unintended injury."1 90 Yet nowhere in the
majority opinion in Sanchez is depraved indifference found
because there were children present. Rather, in his majority
opinion Judge Levine concluded that it was rational for some
people to find that firing a gun at a distance of twelve to eighteen
inches could constitute both intentional and reckless behavior.19 1
Mention of children is only noted in connection with the shooting
by the dissent, which noted that the People had attempted to
argue that the depraved indifference existed because of the
presence of children but that the court had rejected such a
claim.192

that "the Court is limiting Sanchez by properly rejecting the incongruous notion that an
intentional killing can reflect depraved indifference"); People v. Baptiste, 760 N.Y.S.2d
594, 598 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that jury could have found that defendant killed victim
recklessly and not intentionally).
189 See People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 235 (2002) (Ciparick, J., dissenting)
(noting that in Sanchez holding, "the once prominent distinction between depraved
indifference murder and intentional murder has been regrettably obscured"); see also
People v. St. Helen, 742 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (App. Div. 2002) (pointing and firing a gun at a
victim without first checking to see if their were bullets posed substantial risk of death
and thus is sufficient mens rea for depraved indifference murder). But see People v.
Callender, 760 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (App. Div. 2003) (observing that "firing into a crowd is a
classic example of depraved indifference murder").
190 Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1063.
191 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 206 (noting that shooting point blank into victim
readily meet level of depravity necessary); see also People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704,
706-07 (N.Y. 1983) (indicating that modern definitions of murder encompass elements of
intention as well as extreme recklessness). See generally People v. Gomez, 478 N.E.2d
759, 761 (N.Y. 1985) (maintaining that depraved indifference necessitates consideration of
risk presented by defendant's reckless conduct).
192 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 215 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting People argued that
grave risk went to presence of children but court rejected that argument); see also People
v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168-69 (N.Y. 1972) (asserting that because depraved
indifference murder is directed at single person so danger to many is no longer necessary
element of crime). See generally People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1974)
(indicating that danger to many is no longer element of depraved indifference murder).
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In light of this seemingly inconsistent rational for its holding
in Sanchez, the Court of Appeal's decision in Hafeez is a step in
the right direction. However, it is only a first step and more
must be done to undue the apparent merger of depraved
indifference murder and intentional murder caused by Sanchez.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE EXPANSION OF DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE MURDER

A. End ChargingDepravedIndifference and Intentional Murder
for the Same Act
The seemingly simple solution to this issue would be a move by
the legislature to amend the rules of Criminal Procedure or even
a policy by the courts not to submit to the jury murder counts of
both intentional and depraved indifference murder.193
The
present procedural code allows the judge at his discretion not to
permit a count to go to the jury where the clear weight of the
evidence does not support such a theory.1 94 However, the
practical effect of such a remedy may not answer the entire
problem.
Once the practice of submitting both counts of depraved
indifference and intentional murder to the jury is complete,
prosecutors would have to present their case with one theory in
mind and without the advantage of a fall back provision in the
event that they were unable to prove the subject intent of the
defendant.195 Juries would not be asked to distinguish between
two crimes, nor face the possible confusion in attempting to apply
193 See Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1064 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (noting that
intentional murder cannot be confounded with depraved indifference murder); see also
Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 215 (Smith, J., dissenting) (warning against use of depraved
indifference murder as proxy for intentional murder). See generally MICHAELS, supra note
14, at 811 (hoping to adopt indifference standard).
194 See N.Y. CPL § 300.50 (2003) (allowing judge to refuse to submit count to jury at
his discretion); see also People v. Mussenden, 127 N.E.2d 551, 553-54 (N.Y. 1955)
(establishing rule that a judge may refuse to submit count to jury). See generally People v.
Butler, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1338 (N.Y. 1994) (supporting concept that it is in court's
discretion to refuse to submit count to jury).
195 See Register, 457 N.E.2d at 713 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (commenting that
prosecutors would find this advantage too tempting to not use); see also Sanchez, 777
N.E.2d at 215 (Smith, J., dissenting) (indicating potential abuse by prosecutors). See
generally MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 795 (noting advantages offered to prosecutors in
this regard).
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them.196 However, without more, this limitation would only
increase the problem of depraved mind murder merging with
intentional murder. Rather than force prosecutors to charge
intentional murder when the evidence is consistent only with
intentional acts, this limitation may in fact quicken the process
of depraved indifference murder taking the place of intentional
murder.
With the interpretation espoused in Sanchez,
prosecutors no longer need to charge both counts in the
alternative but can rely on the one charge of depraved
indifference to encompass a broad range of homicides.19 7 Hafeez
has limited this concern somewhat, but not enough to solve the
problem.
B. Return to the Darry "Multiple Victim" Requirement
A return to the multiple victim requirement articulated in
Darry would certainly provide the necessary limitation on the
application of the crime of depraved indifference murder.198 It
would also provide a bright line test for the jury to differentiate
intentional from depraved indifference murder.19 9 However, the
removal of the multiple victim requirement was a change that
occurred as a result of legislative action and not judicial decisionmaking. 20 0 The removal of the multiple victim requirement
196 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 227 (N.Y. 2002) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (indicating
potential for misleading jury); see also State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me. 1980)
(noting that charging both intentional and depraved indifference murder may lead to jury
confusion). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, 423 (detailing possibilities of jury
confusion).
197 See Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 225 n.16 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (indicating
advantages of matching crime to requisite culpability); see also Register, 457 N.E.2d at
713 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (noting that culpability of defendant should fit crime). See
generally Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d at 1064 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (detailing unfortunate
coalescing of intentional murder and depraved indifference murder).
198 See Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 120 (1854) (establishing multiple victim
requirement of depraved indifference murder); see also MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 799800 (noting that multiple victim requirement served as distinction between intentional
murder and deprave indifference murder). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 423
(detailing prior use of multiple victim requirement in depraved indifference murder
prosecutions).
199 See MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 799 (discussing benefits of multiple victim
requirement); see also Rationales,supra note 152, at 88 (preferring use of multiple victim
requirement). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 423 (detailing use of multiple victim
requirement).
200 Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2003), with N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 183
(1907) (superceded) (removing multiple victim requirement which was present in latter).
See People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. 1972) (asserting that because depraved
indifference murder is directed at single person that danger to many is no longer
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occurred because certain acts, such as child abuse, should have
been included in the murder statute but were barred because of
the multiple victim requirement. 20 1 Yet, the need to include
child abuse cases is no longer a valid argument against the
"multiple victim" requirement as New York presently has a
provision dealing with that specific crime. 2 02 Still, any change
would require legislative action.
C. Increased Mens Rea Requirement
Another possible solution that would require legislative action
would be to increase the mens rea requirement of the crime. The
series of decisions that have expanded the definition of the crime
to include acts that only suggest intent appears to have left the
court torn between its prior decisions. On one hand, the court
stresses "depravity of mind" as an essential element of the crime,
while on the other hand disregards the subjective mental state of
the defendant, even in areas that would mitigate a finding of
depravity.
Although the Court of Appeals has consistently noted that the
modern Penal Law contains only four mens rea elements; the
court continues to struggle with the degree of "reckless"
necessary for depraved indifference murder; one that adequately
differentiates between the various types of homicides that use
the mens rea element of "recklessness" to define the actor's
mental state. 20 3 As the court continues to grapple with an
acceptable definition of the mens rea element, it becomes more
necessary element of crime); see also People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1974)
(indicating that danger to many is no longer element of depraved indifference murder).
201 See Rationales,supra note 152, at 76 (noting that child abuse would be excluded
from crime of depraved indifference murder with multiple victim requirement); see also
MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 792 (indicating potential consequences of multiple victim
requirement); see generally GEGAN, supra note 4, at 423 (detailing rationale behind
removing multiple victim requirement).
202 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(4) (McKinney 2003) (defining type of depraved
indifference murder where victim is minor); see also People v. Cole, 652 N.E.2d 912, 913
(N.Y. 1995) (applying this theory of depraved indifference murder). See generally People v.
Strawbridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (App. Div. 2002) (utilizing this version of depraved
indifference murder).
203 See People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that degree of
recklessness that ought to be applied is still problematic and looking for heightened
recklessness); see also People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 2002) (indicating use
of significantly heightened recklessness standard). See generally People v. Register, 457
N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983) (noting present statute defines crime by reference to
circumstances under which it occurs and expressly states that recklessness is required
element of mental culpability).
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apparent that legislative action will be necessary to conclude this
debate.
Such action by the legislature should define a mental state
specifically to address depraved indifference murder as a unique
concept in the criminal law, one that clarifies the ambiguities
that have arisen under the modern interpretation of the law and
embraces the "depravity of mind" that the Court of Appeals has
found to be the core element of depraved indifference murder.
Professor Moreland has argued that any amendment to the
depraved indifference murder statute should not include the
mens rea of "recklessness" at all. 2 04
He finds that since
recklessness is the same mens rea that is used for the crime of
manslaughter, the division between manslaughter and murder
would be too close to be properly distinguished. 2 05
Yet,
Professors Wechsler and Michaels find that depraved
indifference murder describes conduct of "extremely gross
recklessness" distinguishing murder from manslaughter by the
greater danger of the act and thus the greater indifference. 206
Professor Moreland however finds adding "extremely" to
recklessness does not go far enough to capture the idea of a
"depraved mind" required by this crime. 2 07 Moreover, he finds
that this distinction "is like drawing the weight line between a
'big bear' and an 'extremely big bear,"' 2 08 stressing that if the

204 See Roy Moreland, A Re-Examination of the Law of Homicide In 1971: The Model
Penal Code, 59 KY. L.J. 788, 798 (1970-1971) (noting that "recklessly" should be term
reserved only for negligent manslaughter); see also MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 788-90
(indicating possible implications of term "recklessly"). See generally GEGAN, supra note 4
(detailing uses of term recklessly in penal law).
205 See MORELAND, supra note 204, at 798 (noting that manslaughter and depraved
indifference murder are too difficult to distinguish since both crimes require
recklessness); see also MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 797-98 (indicating use term
"recklessly" in depraved indifference homicide and in manslaughter). See generally
GEGAN, supra note 4 (detailing consequences of use of term recklessly in penal law).
206 See WECHSLER, supra note 20, at 709 (noting that negligent murder is separated
from manslaughter but relatively greater danger of act); see also MICHAELS, supra note
14, at 788-90 (indicating gradations of mental culpability in penal law). See generally
GEGAN, supra note 4 (surveying different states of mental culpability in New York and
their varied applications).
207 See MORELAND, supra note 204, at 798 (indicating difficulty in articulating
manageable definition of depraved indifference homicide); see also MICHAELS, supra note
14, at 801 (detailing varied constructions of recklessness in penal law). See generally
GEGAN, supra note 4 (noting different difficulty in using term recklessly).
208 MORELAND, supra note 204, at 798.
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same words are used for manslaughter and murder both judges
20 9
and juries would have great difficulty separating the crimes.
Rather, Professor Moreland argues that the best description of
the mens rea of the crime of depraved indifference murder is
"'wanton disregard' for the lives and safety of others." 2 10
Wantonness, according to Professor Moreland satisfies the
"antisocial requirement found in common law negligent murder,
and would capture the idea of general malice or as he bluntly
phased the mental attitude of the defendant, as "I don't give a
2
damn if I do kill somebody by my extremely dangerous act." 11
Other commentators have also looked favorably towards a
mens rea of depraved indifference murder that is based on
"wantonness".
Professor Perkins describes this crime as a
"wanton and willful disregard of unreasonable human risk"2 12
and captures the idea of general malice as the actor's "man
endangering state of mind." 2 13 Perkins describes this as a mens
rea where there is no intent to kill an individual and possibly
even a wish that death would be avoided "if willfully done with
the knowledge that it may probably cause death or great bodily
The Model Penal Code however, rejects these
injury."2 14
arguments in finding that although they remain faithful to the
"common law phrasing they do so at a great cost in clarity." 2 15
Unfortunately, the present New York Statute, which draws its
wording from the Model Penal Code, has not brought about the
requisite clarity necessary to prevent its ever broadening
application.
Professor Michaels finds that a different mental state is
required all together, the mens rea of "acceptance." 2 16 Under this
209 See id. (noting judges and juries would have most difficult time separating
manslaughter from depraved indifference murder); see also Windham v. State, 602 So. 2d
798, 809 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J., dissenting) (suggesting that depraved heart murder as
interpreted in Mississippi "subsumes" both deliberate design murder and most various
manslaughter statutes). But see People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707-08 (N.Y. 1983)
(stating that depraved indifference murder requires significantly heightened recklessness,
distinguishing it from manslaughter).
210 MORELAND, supra note 204, at 797.
211 MORELAND, supra note 204, at 797.
212 Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537,
555 (1933-34).
213 Id. at 557.
214 Id. at 556.
215 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
216 Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953,
960-63 (1998) (defining mens rea of acceptance); see also Rationales, supra note 152, at 86
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scheme an actor is judged by the question "would you have done
it if you would have known?" 2 17 Although this method requires
an almost totally subjective inquiry, it does not differ greatly
from the idea of "wantonness." Still, Professor Byrn finds that
"wantonness" is the key. 2 18 Under his formulation, this crime
focuses on the subjective intent of the actor involving "a
realization and appreciation of the nature and gravity of the risk
and a willingness that death should occur". 2 19 Professor Byrn
argues that because this crime punishes conduct found to be
"equivalent in spirit to actual intent," the objective circumstances
should have no more part in this crime than in the definition of
intent. 22 0 Although the main concern of Professor Byrn is the
separation of the crimes of manslaughter and murder, inquiry
into the subjective mental state of the defendant would give the
jury a better ability to make a finding of the "depravity of mind"
required for general malice. 2 2 1 This reading of the proper mens
rea is consistent with the understanding by the court in that

(restating argument that reckless conduct deserves punishment equivalent to knowing
conduct when actor engages in conduct with mental state of acceptance). See generally
Symposium, The Model Penal Code Revisited: The Model Penal Code and Three Two
(Possibly Only One) Ways Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 139, 194 (2000)
(discussing Michael's suggestion of "acceptance" as another level of mens rea).
217 MICHAELS, supra note 216, at 961.
218 See BYRN, supra note 155, at 186 (noting "wantonness as the key"); see also James
R. Acker, Article, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's
Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REV. 41, 80 (1996) (discussing how "wanton"
requirement might be construed). See generally People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204, 216
(2002) (Smith, J., dissenting) (describing wanton disregard of human life as one indulging
in highly reckless behavior that falls short of certainty of death or serious injury).
219 BYRN, supra note 155, at 191.
220 See BYRN, supra note 155, at 188 (arguing reasonable man standard should have
no more part in depraved indifference murder than it does when crime is intentional); see
also MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 793-94 (outlining advantages of objective circumstances
analysis, yet stating it has critical shortcomings both in theory and practice). See
generally V.F. Nourse, Article, Hearts and Minds: Understandingthe New Culpability, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 361, 367-68 (2002) (explaining how states apply depraved heart murder
doctrine differently, with only some taking into account objective circumstances which
indicate depraved indifference).
221 See BYRN, supra note 155, at 189 (discussing benefits of opening scope of inquiry
to include subjective element and discard objective elements when examining depraved
indifference murder). See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Article, Don't Abandon the
Model Penal Code Yet! Thinking Through Simon's Rethinking, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 185,
204-05 (2002) (setting out examples of what constitutes subjective mental state of actors).
But see Robin Charlow, Article, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 286 n.94 (2002) (claiming that nature of proof used to substantiate
subjective elements complicates establishing existence of required mental state).
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depraved indifference murder requires a showing of a "wanton
2 22
indifference to human life."
D. Revised Statute
Finally, if the courts are unwilling to impose self-restraint
upon the application of the statue, the burden then falls upon the
legislature to revise the depraved indifference murder statute
entirely to correct the interpretation of the law and to reassert
the conclusions of the revision commission. The legislature, in
re-drafting the depraved indifference murder law will have to go
even further than the creation of a new mens rea element that
will differentiate this crime from manslaughter. The legislature
will also have limit the application of the crime to prevent broad
application and concretely separate it from intentional murder.
If a new, revised statute is to be drafted it must incorporate the
aims of many of the possible solutions, in order to more clearly
define the crime of depraved indifference murder. The revised
statute should look as follows:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when
Without intent to take the life of a particular person, he
wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person, and thereby causes the death of
another person.
Wantonly - a person acts wantonly when, without
justification or excuse he unreasonably and maliciously risks
22 3
harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences.
Under this wording, a line is drawn between depraved
indifference murder, and both intentional murder and
The use of the new mens rea element of
manslaughter.
wantonness creates a crime that is sufficiently different from
manslaughter to avoid the present confusion by providing an
222 See People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 206 (N.Y. 1986) (noting depravity of
mind a core element of depraved indifference murder); see also John A. Alesandro,
Comments: Physician-Assisted Suicide and New York Law, 57 ALB. L. REV. 820, 868
(1994) (describing that this depraved indifference to human life is what distinguishes
reckless manslaughter from depraved mind murder). See generally Kyron Huigens,
Article, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 97, 124 (2002) (explaining how
Model Penal Code defines depraved heart murder "in terms of recklessness plus extreme
indifference to human life").
223 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1576 (7th ed. 1999) (offering definition of wanton).
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independent definition of the actor's mental state. The result is a
mens rea element that comes closer to the common law idea of
general malice and does not require the difficult task to
differentiating between "ordinary recklessness" and the present
"heightened recklessness."
Further, the mens rea of
"wantonness" allows for the fact finder to make an inquiry into
the subjective mental state of the actor, thus allowing for such
mitigating factors as extreme emotional disturbance. Finally,
this wording does not allow the crime to be applied when the
intent to take life is directed at a particular person, thereby
separating this crime from intentional murder. This phrase also
addresses the concerns of the Model Penal Code that depraved
indifference can be directed at a single individual. However, it
also includes a multiple victim requirement when there is intent
to take life, thereby capturing the idea of a general or
indiscriminate malice.
CONCLUSION

Hafeez presents the first step by the Court of Appeals to end
the expansion of depraved indifference murder, however this case
is only the beginning.
The real solution remains in an
interpretation of the law that is consistent with the legislative
history of the statute, one that takes into account the long
history of judicial interpretation in New York, a history that
presents a direct link between the modern codification and its
common law origins. This requires an understanding that the
law of homicide in New York did not spring forth anew with the
1967 Penal code, but is the product of a legal tradition that dates
back to the common law. In Hafeez the Court of Appeals has
taken the first step, but there must be others.

